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AFTER CRA WFORD DOUBLE-SPEAK:
"TESTIMONY" DOES NOT MEAN
TESTIMONY AND "WITNESS" DOES NOT
MEAN WITNESS
JOSEPHINE ROSS*
A controversy has raged since the U.S. Supreme Court altered the
Confrontation Clause landscape in Crawford v. Washington. There, the
Court coined the term "testimonial" as a means of determining whether a
person who makes an out-of-court statement is a witness against the
defendant and must therefore testify in person. This Article advocates a
new definition that would be more in keeping with the meaning of the word
"testimony" and with the functions served by the Confrontation Clause.
Currently the Court determines whether a hearsay declarant is a witness
based upon what occurred at the time the person made his out-of-court
statement. Instead, this Article proposes that the Court should decide if
out-of-court statements constitute testimony based on whether the
declarants functioned as witnesses against the defendant at trial. With the
recent case of Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court had a chance to
refine the concept of "testimonial. " This Article critiques Davis and
illustrates how the application of the definition proposed here would have
avoided Davis' confused and contradictory reasoning. Shifting the
timeframe from the production of evidence to the use of the evidence in the
courtroom will create a jurisprudence more in line with Crawford's
promise to revive an important trial right for those accused of crimes.
* Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. I am grateful to Dean
Kurt Schmoke for providing ongoing support. Professor Andrew Taslitz and Professor
George Fisher each earned my utmost appreciation for their comments on earlier drafts. I
also wish to thank two law students that put in long hours this summer: Sherina Maye and
Chelsey Rodgers. This Article grew out of a talk I gave at an AALS clinical conference, and
for that I thank organizer Professor Michael Pinard.
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I. INTRODUCTION: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES AFTER CRA WFORD
Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with [a] jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what
the Sixth Amendment prescribes.
- Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Crawford v. Washington
Two years after Crawford v. Washington created a wave of uncertainty
regarding the significance of the newly defined Confrontation Clause, the
Supreme Court issued a decision defining the terms "testimony" and
"testimonial" that was intended to clarify Crawford's ambiguities. The new
case, Davis v. Washington (Davis/Hammon),2 puts to rest some of
Crawford's ambiguity, but does not resolve Crawford's central
contradiction between its desire for more face-to-face confrontation and its
limited reading of the scope of the Confrontation Clause.
Before Crawford, domestic violence cases had evolved in many states
to the point that the government was presenting its case without testimony
from the alleged victim or other eyewitnesses.3 In lieu of the complainant,
police officers would testify to what the complainant had told the police at
the scene.4 In many situations, the 911 call or the complainant's statement
to police responding to the scene was the only evidence against the
defendant . These statements were labeled "excited utterances" or
"spontaneous declarations" by prosecutors and judges, and were thus
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rules. 6 Constitutional analysis
541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
2 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). The decision reviewed two domestic violence convictions:
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126. S.
Ct. 2266 (2006), and State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2266
(2006). The Supreme Court's Davis opinion combined the two cases, so I will refer to it
hereinafter as Davis/Hammon.
3 Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REv.
1171 (2002); see also Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless
Prosecution?, 28 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 301, 309 (2005).
4 See Peter R. Dworkin, Confronting Your Abuser In Oregon: A New Domestic Violence
Hearsay Exception, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 299, 301-03 (2001) (describing new statutes in
Oregon and California to make witnessless prosecutions easier); David M. Gersten,
Evidentiary Trends in Domestic Violence, FLA. BAR J., July/Aug. 1998, at 65. My
experience in the courts of Massachusetts during the 1990s confirms what other
commentators noticed elsewhere. See also Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence
Issues in Domestic Violence Civil Cases, 34 FAM. L.Q. 43, 52-54 & n.45 (2000) (stating that
many criminal prosecution offices were starting to use witnessless "prosecution strategies[,]
thus necessitating creative application of the hearsay exceptions").
5 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant Davis at 4, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5224)
[hereinafter Brief of Petitioner Davis]; Friedman & McCormack, supra note 3, at 1177-80.
6 FED. R. EVID. 803(2). Excited utterance is defined as: "A statement relating to a
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before Crawford determined that once the hearsay rules were satisfied, so
was the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.7 As a result, the
government did not need to worry about obtaining the alleged victim's
cooperation or summoning the witness to court. Men and women could be
arrested, tried, and convicted by an accusation that was never subject to
oath or cross-examination.
Crawford restored the constitutional right to confront witnesses from
the rules of evidence, thus revitalizing the Confrontation Clause.8 In so
doing, the decision threatened to end the recent practice of relying on out-
of-court statements rather than eyewitness testimony at trial in domestic
violence prosecutions. In Crawford, the Supreme Court determined that
even if a statement is admissible under a state's evidentiary rules, the
statement may violate the Confrontation Clause if there is no opportunity to
cross-examine the witness. 9 The Court announced that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees live witness testimony unless the witness is unavailable,
in which case only prior testimony subject to cross-examination is
permitted.' 0
Criticism of Crawford's ambiguity abounds. 1 One judge in New
York put his frustration into writing when he was asked to admit an
emergency call to the police under the excited utterance exception:
Are such calls testimonial in nature, or not? Do they constitute "police interrogation"
(because the caller answers questions posed by the police operator), or not? May they
be admitted into evidence under various traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule? Or
would their admission violate the Sixth Amendment? The Crawford decision is rich
startling event or condition made while the Declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition." Id.
7 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) ("Reliability can be inferred without more
in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases,
the evidence" may be admitted upon "a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (quoting
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). Roberts was followed by a number of Supreme Court cases,
including United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), and White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346
(1992).
8 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56-57.
9 Id. at 53.
10 Id. at 57.
11 Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence was highly critical of the majority's break with
the Court's prior jurisprudence. In determining the future of Crawford in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, one must note that Crawford's validity will not be threatened by the
replacements of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 2005 and Justice O'Connor in 2006 since they
wrote the critical concurrence, whereas all seven justices who joined the majority are still on
the bench. The lone dissenter in Davis v. Washington was Justice Thomas. Davis v.




in detail about the law of England in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, but-as the
Chief Justice points out-it fails to give urgently needed guidance as to how to apply
the Sixth Amendment right now, in the 21 st century.
12
To resolve the uncertainty, the United States Supreme Court consolidated
two cases, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, and issued one
decision officially known as Davis v. Washington that resolved both
appeals. 13  Hammon questioned whether statements made to police
responding to the scene of an alleged act of domestic violence are
admissible at trial through the police officer when there is no opportunity to
cross-examine the person who made the statements. 4 Davis challenged the
admissibility of 911 calls accusing a person of a criminal act without the
opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the out-of-court
allegation.1 5 Together, these cases covered the typical methods employed
by the state to successfully prosecute domestic violence cases without the
cooperation of a complaining witness, pitting the right to confront one's
accusers against the expanded use of the excited utterance hearsay
exception. Thus with Davis/Hammon, the Court had an opportunity to
reaffirm Crawford's preference for live witnesses at trial over hearsay
accusations. This Article will discuss in-depth how the Court approached
this opportunity.
Section II of this Article presents a domestic violence case handled by
students at Boston College Law School before Crawford was decided to
illustrate how the "excited utterance" exception worked in practice. The
alleged victim did not appear, and the government attempted to base its case
on statements made at the scene. The case helps explore the importance of
cross-examination and the concept of "witness," concepts at the heart of the
Confrontation Clause.
Section III explains how Crawford recognized the need to end
hearsay-based prosecutions but failed to deliver a ruling that would ensure
its demise. Crawford pulled in two inconsistent directions: one that
required accusers to come to court to testify; and the other that limited the
12 People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877-78 (2004); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at
75-76 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[Tihousands of federal prosecutors and.. . tens of
thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of
'testimony' the Court lists.., is covered by the new rule. They need them now, not months
or years from now. Rules of criminal evidence are applied every day in courts throughout
the country, and parties should not be left in the dark in this manner.").
'3 126 S. Ct. 2266.
14 See Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 829 N.E.2d 444
(Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
15 See State v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), ajfd, 11l P.3d 844 (Wash.
2005), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
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scope of the Confrontation Clause to exclude many witnesses whose out-of-
court accusations form the proof of criminal wrongdoing.
Section IV analyzes the recent Supreme Court case of Davis/Hammon
that applied Crawford's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence to domestic
violence prosecutions. On the one hand, the Court's decision changed the
practice in the trial courts to prevent a large range of hearsay from
substituting for live testimony. On the other hand, the Court's reasoning
was inconsistent and may be read as a road map for police and prosecutors
to circumvent the confrontation requirement in domestic violence cases
where statements fit the "excited utterance" doctrine. Ultimately there was
a contradiction in Davis/Hammon, just as there was in Crawford. The
Court wanted more confrontation but defined the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses in a way that allowed many
witnesses to accuse others without testifying in person.'
6
Section V examines how other scholars have viewed the values and
contours of the Confrontation Clause post-Crawford. Unlike previous
scholarly works, this Article lays out a definition of "testimonial" that
examines the role testimony had at trial rather than trying to decipher what
occurred when the statement was originally uttered out-of-court. The Sixth
Amendment is a trial right, but the Court insists on treating the Amendment
as a question of police procedures more akin to Fourth and Fifth
Amendment analysis. The Court misses the real meaning of the Sixth
Amendment right of accused persons to confront the witnesses against
them. Currently, post-Crawford jurisprudence threatens to drift away from
an understanding of how evidence operates within the courtroom and may
create new legal fictions so that "witness" does not mean witness and the
term "testimonial" has little to do with testimony in court.
II. A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE BEFORE CRA WFORD
Indeed, one would shudder at the prospect of a criminal prosecution in which the
evidence for the prosecution consisted solely of a police officer reading his or her
report into the record. 
17
A. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Let me start with a real case in which the government planned to use
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, a case I supervised as a
professor in the Boston College Criminal Justice Clinic. The police report
16 Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266; see infra Section IV.G.




related what had occurred when the police arrived on the scene: "Upon
arrival spoke to [the alleged victim] who stated he has a child with [the
suspect]." The alleged victim told police that the suspect
did knock on victim's door and at this time [the alleged victim] did step out of his
apartment, and while talking to [the suspect] she attempted to stab him with a Black
Handle Kitchen Knife, and after missing she did scratch him on the left side of the
face causing a cut.
18
The report went on to explain that the alleged victim refused medical
attention and told police that the suspect threw the knife over the front
porch railing. The police found the knife and brought a complaint for
assault with a dangerous weapon.19
B. THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULES
In our case, if the alleged victim did not appear at trial to testify
against the accused, the government would proceed anyway, asking the
police officer to repeat the statements made at the scene under the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rules.
An excited utterance, sometimes referred to as a spontaneous utterance
or spontaneous declaration, is a hearsay exception to the rules of evidence
that generally forbids out-of-court statements from being introduced at
trial.20 To be admissible as an excited utterance, the government must show
that the statement was made under "external circumstances of physical
shock" before reasoned reflection was possible.2t One Massachusetts case
from 1994 described the purpose of the excited utterance:
The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule "is based on the experience that,
under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement
may be produced which stills the reflective faculties ... so that the utterance which
then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made
under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief
18 Incident Report, Boston Police, No. 90542845 (Oct. 5, 1999, 5:17 p.m.).
19 The report says that the defendant was arrested but did not mention any statements
taken from her. Later they alleged that she talked to them. No one besides the victim (and
perhaps the defendant) was interviewed.
20 FED. R. EVID. 803(2). See discussion supra note 6.
21 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d 143, 146 (Mass. 2002).
Massachusetts cases also use the term "if the proponent shows that the statement was made
under the influence of an exciting event" to substitute for Wigmore's more flowery
language. Commonwealth v. King, 763 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Mass. 2002). Massachusetts
interpreted its state constitutional right to confront witnesses in line with the Supreme
Court's decision in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), that the government need not
show the witness was unavailable to testify before introducing the excited utterance in place
of live testimony. Commonwealth v. Whelton, 696 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Mass. 1998).
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period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear
by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy.., and
may therefore be received as testimony to those facts."
Wigmore is liberally quoted above, and is generally credited with
creating the hearsay exception in the early part of the twentieth century.
The hearsay exception was expanded exponentially in recent years as
prosecutors sought to improve the conviction rate for domestic violence
cases. 23 Wigmore actually used the term "testimony" in the above quote, a
term which became important after Crawford. Wigmore recognized that by
allowing police to repeat accusations in court under the new hearsay rule,
these accusations were "received as testimony" in court. Wigmore's use of
the term testimony is an accurate description of the trial. Had the judge
allowed the accusation that our client had a knife, it would have been
testimony regardless of whether the statement was made at trial by the
alleged victim, or by the police officer.
During the first fourteen years that I practiced criminal law, the excited
utterance exception was notable in its absence. But starting in 1998,
prosecutors began introducing statements as excited utterances in domestic
violence cases. 24  By 1999, prosecutors were marking all pre-trial
22 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grant, 634 N.E.2d 565, 568-59 (Mass. 1994) (citing
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 222 (1973) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1747 (3d ed. 1940)) (emphasis added).
The test to determine the admissibility of a statement under the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule is as follows. "The utterance must have been [made] before there has been time to
contrive and misrepresent.... [T]he statements need not be strictly contemporaneous with the
exciting cause; they may be subsequent to it, provided there has not been time for the exciting
influence to lose its sway and to be dissipated .... [T]here can be no definite and fixed limit of
time."
Id. at 569 (citing Rocco v. Boston-Leader, Inc., 163 N.E.2d 157 (Mass. 1960) (quoting
WIGMORE,supra, § 1750)).
23 See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF: As GIVEN BY LOGIC,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS (1913);
Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 432 (1928); see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 3, at 1220 (noting
that this expansion took place nationwide); Jeffrey S. Siegel, Timing Isn't Everything:
Massachusetts' Expansion of the Excited Utterance Exception in Severe Criminal Cases, 79
B.U.L. REV. 1241 (1999).
24 My experience arose in Boston, Massachusetts, starting in 1993, and before that in
Worcester, Massachusetts, but other trial courts throughout the state may have had some
differences in this regard. See Siegel, supra note 23 (documenting that expansion of excited
utterance is occurring in key areas besides domestic violence, namely child abuse and
murder).
The expansion of the excited utterance is probably a direct result of White v. Illinois,
which upheld a conviction for abuse of a child based upon statements that were admitted as
spontaneous declarations and statements made for purposes of medical treatment. 502 U.S.
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conference sheets in domestic violence cases with the notation that they
25planned to introduce excited utterances. The government would then plan
on introducing the excited utterances with or without a live witness on the
stand. As a professor, I made a point of teaching students that the police
report was hearsay and was not admissible as evidence. Students were
expected to read reports carefully to separate out which witnesses were
necessary to establish the government's case. In 2002, a student told me I
was wrong. With the expanded excited utterance she explained, the police
report does come into evidence. She had a point; there were no
eyewitnesses, and the officers had memorized their reports and could recite
them in court. By the time Crawford was decided, the prospect of trial by
police report had become a reality in many courts around the country.26
C. HOW THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE DOCTRINE CORRUPTED THE
CONCEPT OF WITNESS
Without the excited utterance exception, the case was doomed. Like
many victims and alleged victims of domestic violence, the man answered
346. White held that the government need not show unavailability of the witness as long as
evidence fit a deeply rooted exception to the hearsay rule. Id. The White decision, as
discussed in Crawford, assumed that the spontaneous declaration was deeply held:
It is questionable whether testimonial statements would ever have been admissible on that
ground in 1791; to the extent the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all, it
required that the statements be made "immediat[ely] upon the hurt received, and before [the
declarant] had time to devise or contrive any thing for her own advantage." In any case, the only
question presented in White was whether the Confrontation Clause imposed an unavailability
requirement on the types of hearsay at issue. The holding did not address the question whether
certain of the statements, because they were testimonial, had to be excluded even if the witness
was unavailable. We "[took] as a given... that the testimony properly falls within the relevant
hearsay exceptions."
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004) (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 348-49;
Thompson v. Trevanion, (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.)) (citations omitted).
25 1 supervised students in Dorchester District Court, a Boston court, from 1993 through
2004. There was a domestic violence court within Dorchester District Court where all the
domestic violence cases in that court were handled. A few prosecutors were specially
assigned to that court.
Another cause of the rise of the use of hearsay to convict in Boston was the creation of
this "domestic violence court" in Dorchester that handled primary domestic violence
charges. The use of the hearsay exception was foreshadowed by the presiding judge of the
Dorchester court, who urged prosecutors to employ the evidentiary rule as a way to prevent
dismissals of domestic violence cases. For the perspective of a judge outside of
Massachusetts who admits that the evidence rules are changing as part of response to
society's interest in combating domestic violence, see Gersten, supra note 4, at 67.
26 Friedman & McCormack, supra note 3, at 1171, 1176-80 & n.23; Mark Hansen, New
Strategy in Battering Cases: About a Third of Jurisdictions Prosecute Even Without Victim 's
Testimony, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 14; see supra note 4.
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police questions at the scene about what happened, but later chose not to
cooperate with the District Attorney's office. Before the expansion of the
excited utterance rule, if the victim did not testify, the state would not be
able to meet the elements of the charge. At trial, the police would only be
able to testify that they went to the house, saw the alleged victim, and
recovered a knife where he pointed. The State would not be able to prove
that anyone assaulted the alleged victim, since there were no witnesses to
testify to the assault. Thus, the knife would be the lone piece of evidence,
useless when unconnected to any narrative. Thanks to the expanded excited
utterance exception, however, the government planned to try this case with
or without the alleged witness' cooperation. If the alleged victim did not
show up or recanted, the officer would take the stand and testify to what the
alleged victim had told him at the scene. Cases such as this one that would
have been dismissed could now be prosecuted, resulting in many more
guilty pleas as well as trials.
The disadvantages to the expanded excited utterance exception and the
accompanying erosion of the accused's right to confront witnesses are more
subtle but no less substantial. As this case illustrates, there is a corrupting
influence when a police officer can testify merely by reciting what a witness
told him some months before. Justice became corrupted when a shift
occurred in the understanding of the term "witness." In our case, when the
alleged victim's statements came into trial, that person was a witness in any
real understanding of the term. Whether that person was lying or mistaken
mattered; whether the alleged victim had a bias mattered. In fact, the case
turned on whether the jury believed that the alleged victim was telling the
truth beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the Sixth Amendment, counsel had
a right to cross-examine witnesses. However, the shift in the law before
Crawford allowed the police officer to become the key prosecution witness,
even though he did not witness the event that allegedly occurred.
The corruption of the concept of witness became most evident when
one considered cross-examination of the alleged victim. Had our students
been able to cross-examine him, they would have brought out his motive in
pinning the crime on the defendant and in negating his own guilt. The
students could have attacked the alleged victim's story for inconsistencies.
Finally, the jury would have had an opportunity to take the measure of the
man when he testified. It was little comfort that the students could cross-
examine the police officer. The officer was not an eyewitness to the crime,
and no inconsistencies in the victim's stories could be extracted.
Particularly galling to the truth function was that as a professional, the
police officer would make a far more convincing witness than the alleged
victim, and hence the alleged victim's story gained credibility in the
retelling. The defendant in our case was unable to confront the witness
2006]
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against her because her lawyer could cross-examine only the police officer
and not the alleged victim.
This notion of a witness not being a witness played out in the clinic
case during negotiations with the prosecutor. In our case, the alleged victim
had a criminal record and was on a suspended sentence for selling drugs.
Normally, a criminal defendant in Massachusetts has a right to impeach a
witness with criminal convictions and current probation obligations that
might show a desire to cooperate with the government to protect the
witness's self-interest. 27 In this case, once the victim's record came to the
jury's attention, the jury might be less likely to believe what the victim told
police, and it would enhance the defendant's theory of the case that the
witness had something to lose by shifting the blame. The student attorney
showed the prosecutor a copy of the victim's record with the hope that this
would encourage the prosecutor to consider dropping the charges. Instead,
the prosecutor decided she would neither subpoena the victim to court nor
call him to the stand at trial. That way, the prosecutor explained, she would
be able to block the defense from introducing the victim's record. 8 In the
prosecutor's mindset, criminal records were only allowed to impeach
witnesses, and by keeping the victim off the stand, she thought the victim
was no longer a witness. As a result, the police officer was the witness, and
his credibility was at issue.2 9 I do not intend this as a criticism of the
particular prosecutor but of the Confrontation Clause doctrine. This was a
veteran assistant district attorney who had garnered much respect because
of her fairness and judicial temperament. This example illustrates the
corroding influence of the pre-Crawford approach to confrontation rights
and how quickly the deprivation of one civil liberty can spread to take away
other rights. In this case, a trial without confrontation also threatened to
become a trial without impeachment. The case also illuminated the need to
27 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233 § 21 (2000).
28 The prosecutor was not on solid legal ground in thinking that the victim's record
would not come in to impeach the declarant if she did not testify live. Massachusetts' rules
of evidence were generally consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 806, in providing that
when a hearsay statement has been admitted into evidence, the credibility of the declarant
may be attacked. PAUL J. LIACOS, MARK S. BRODIN & MICHAEL AVERY, HANDBOOK OF
MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE § 8.4.3 (7th ed. 1999); see FED. R. EVID. 806.
29 I did not expect a judge or appellate court to back up the prosecutor, but the prosecutor
truly believed that she was right. Again we see the influence of Wigmore. In his writings,
Wigmore reduced the confrontation right to no more than "a right to cross-examine the
witnesses the prosecutor produced at trial." Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. LAW
BULL. 99, 104 n.24 (1972) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 131); see also Margaret A.
Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a
Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 572 & n.62 (1992).
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interpret the Crawford opinion in a manner that revitalized the right to
confront witnesses.
Another corrupting aspect of the excited utterance doctrine concerns
police memory. For the victim's allegation of the knife assault to qualify as
an excited utterance, the judge must find that the alleged victim made the
statement under the shock of the event while the reflective faculties that
allowed him to dissemble were stilled. When the student investigator
interviewed one of the police officers, the officer used all the magic words
that would trigger a court to find the statements were excited utterances.
The officer spoke of the alleged victim being "definitely still under the
shock of the event" and "definitely excited." However, at the interview,
this officer could not remember if he arrived at the scene first or if another
officer was at the scene and had already started the investigation. The
interview raises questions of whether the officer really had a memory that
the alleged victim was in shock and whether he could know he was under
the influence of the exciting event when the officer had never met him
before. The officer's words, repeated by police in multitudes of domestic
violence cases since the excited utterance exception was expanded, were
formulaic incantations to avoid the case getting thrown out. The legal
fiction had corrupted the process of police memory.
It is doubtful that the prosecutor and police in our case really believed
that the alleged victim had no capacity to lie because of the shock of the
traumatic event. Through the decade preceding Crawford, statements
introduced under the excited utterance exception were not really "verbal
reflexes." Rather, they were incriminating statements made by someone
who had the ability to lie, just like all human beings, though they might be
less likely to lie. Government officials, including judges, were thus
participating in a legal fiction and making an end run around the Sixth
Amendment to reach the understandable goal of prosecuting people who
may otherwise have escaped punishment.
In our case, the student attorneys made a motion for funds for an
expert to help the court evaluate whether the statement in this case
constituted a reliable statement under scientific theory. As a matter of
science, people have the capacity to lie less than one minute after a
shocking event.30 There is some psychological literature from the 1920s
that suggests that the danger of fabrication decreases when the declarant
30 HAROLD BURTT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 71-76 (1931) (a few seconds is enough for a
person to create a falsehood); Stanley A. Goldman, Distorted Vision: Spontaneous
Explanations as a "Firmly Rooted" Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV




makes a contemporaneous statement or a statement within a couple of
seconds of an event.3' But as one commentator noted about the early
scientific studies: "[O]nce the number of seconds has increased even
slightly the reliability of the description is substantially reduced. Thus, the
hearsay statement would have to be spoken virtually simultaneously with
the described event for even the slightest assurance of increased
reliability., 32  In our case, the police arrived approximately five minutes
after the 911 call. In Massachusetts, it was not extraordinary for statements
made an hour or more after the event to qualify as excited utterances.33
Time was not going to be a factor that the government would need to
overcome unless we prevailed on our motion that asked the court to ignore
precedent in favor of science.
The judge denied the students' motion for funds to hire an expert
because legally, the issue of whether the statement fit the reliable verbal
reflex requirement is a question for the judge and not the jury.34 However,
31 Goldman, supra note 30, at 460.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 752 N.E.2d 841 (Mass. 2001) (saying that the
court need not decide whether a statement to police made almost seventeen hours after the
declarant was free of the defendant's control was beyond the "outer limit[s]" of the
spontaneous utterance exception); Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 741 N.E.2d 827, 839 (Mass.
2001) (holding that the distress of the underlying event had not dissipated when a statement
was made approximately one-half hour after the robbery); Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 692
N.E.2d 45, 50-51 (Mass. 1998) (ruling that an eight hour interval between the event and the
statement is "at an outer limit for qualifying" statement as a spontaneous exclamation, and
facsimile should not have been allowed for it lacked indicia of reliability, although "there
may be circumstances in which... stress continues over a long interval of time after the
triggering exciting event," which would justify the admission of belated statements as
excited utterances); Commonwealth v. Brown, 602 N.E.2d 575, 577 (Mass. 1992)
(concluding that the statement of a three and one half-year-old made at the hospital
approximately five hours after a severe beating was admissible as a spontaneous utterance);
Siegel, supra note 23, at 1242. Massachusetts also dispensed with the requirement that the
evidence must tend to "qualify, characterize and explain the underlying event."
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Mass. 2002) (quoting and overruling
Commonwealth v. Crawford, 629 N.E.2d 1332 (Mass. 1994)). The underlying exciting
event may be proved by the excited utterance itself. See Commonwealth v. King, 763
N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Mass. 2002); Commonwealth v. Nunes, 712 N.E.2d 88, 91 (Mass.
1999).
34 See, e.g., Santiago, 774 N.E.2d at 148 (reversing the appeals court because there was
evidence to support the trial judge's decision to find the statement fit the spontaneous
utterance requirement and was therefore sufficiently reliable: "The judge was within her
discretion to admit the statement"); see also LIAcos, BRODIN & AVERY, supra note 28,
§ 8.16, at 554 (writing that judges may exclude statements as unreliable if "the
circumstances do not demonstrate that a statement was spontaneous and made without an
opportunity for reflection"). But see Commonwealth v. Moquette, 791 N.E.2d 294, 299
(Mass. 2003) ("The mere existence of such contrary evidence does not operate to add an
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the students' work did pay off in this case. After a hearing, the judge ruled
that he was not sufficiently satisfied of the reliability of the excited
utterance, so the witness would have to testify in person. The case was
dismissed on the trial date.35 This was a highly unusual result, as any
practicing attorney in domestic violence court in Boston would attest.36 The
rare disposition made the case highly memorable to me, so I use it for its
capacity to illuminate the issues, despite the practically sui generis result.
The problem of fitting domestic violence crimes into the criminal
justice model of the founding fathers has been difficult. Tom Lininger
estimates that as many as 80 to 90% of domestic violence victims recant or
do not come to court. 37 Our case fit the recanting mold. The alleged victim
even wrote a letter denying his ex-girlfriend's guilt.
The clinic case illustrated the meaning of the term "witness" in a trial
where the accuser is absent. When an alleged victim's accusations come
into trial, that person is a witness in any real understanding of the concept.
Whether that declarant was lying or mistaken matters; whether the witness
had a bias matters; and whether the witness was leaving something out
(such as pushing the defendant before she drew a knife) might make the
additional requirement of corroboration in order for the spontaneous utterance to constitute
evidence sufficient for conviction."); King, 763 N.E.2d at 1076 ("Our recognition of that
broad discretion to determine whether the prerequisites for the exception are met does not
suggest that a trial judge has the authority to exclude a spontaneous utterance that meets
those prerequisites on the ground that, in light of other evidence, the statement no longer
appears reliable .... Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled
domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest
could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken
as particularly trustworthy ... and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts."
(quoting WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 1747)).
35 The dismissal was without prejudice, allowing the government to retry the case and
summon the victim for a trial if it chose. One might want to speculate on the reason for the
judge's decision. Perhaps it might be based on the fact that the victim's record was
unsavory, or perhaps the squeaky wheel approach to criminal defense worked-better to let
one knife-wielding female go than risk an appellate decision that experts have to be allowed
in all these excited utterance cases. Then again, perhaps there was some gender aspect to the
decision. Did the fact that the victim was male and the defendant female change the
paradigm in a way that made the fiction of the excited utterance less palatable to the judge?
Unfortunately, such issues are beyond the confines of this Article.
36 In King, the trial judge admitted a statement even though the victim recanted,
explaining that "once the foundational requirements had been met, he did not have discretion
to decide that the spontaneous utterances were unreliable and thereby exclude them." 763
N.E.2d at 1075. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed. Id. at 1076.
37 Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against
Women, 36 IND. L. REV. 687, 709 n.76 (2003). This statistic is cited in cases showing that
appellate courts are aware of the problem, and it affects their decisions regarding admitting
evidence. See, e.g., Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. 2004).
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difference between a guilty verdict and an acquittal. In fact, the case turned
on whether the jury believed the witness was telling the truth beyond a
reasonable doubt. As Richard Friedman has pointed out, the notion that this
type of hearsay is so reliable that nothing could be gained from cross-
examination is like allowing a judge to decide that a witness' testimony on
direct was so reliable that we can fairly dispense with cross-examination.38
Owing to the expanded excited utterance rules, people whose accusations
served to convict a criminal defendant were not necessarily witnesses and
the right to cross-examine witnesses was applied to in-court witnesses only.
This was the state of affairs when Crawford was decided.
III. CRA WFORD'S PROMISE
So what is all the fuss about? A paradigm shift in confrontation clause analysis, that's
what.
39
The text of the Sixth Amendment uses the term witnesses. It states:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him. 40 How should the courts define
"witnesses" against an accused? Do criminal defendants only have a right
to cross-examine those witnesses who actually appear at trial or is the term
so broad that it includes all hearsay declarants? Before Crawford was
decided, Ohio v. Roberts controlled the interpretation of the clause. 4'
Theoretically, any declarant was a witness for Sixth Amendment purposes
under Roberts.42 However, because the Sixth Amendment did not require
38 Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J.
1011, 1028 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Confrontation] ("If a witness delivers live
testimony at trial, the court does not excuse the witness from cross-examination on the
ground that the evidence is so reliable that cross-examination is unnecessary to assist the
determination of truth.").
39 People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 99 P.3d
2 (Cal. 2004) (still pending on appeal; consolidated with People v. Kilday, 105 P.3d 114
(Cal. 2005)) (analyzing Crawford). Note that the California court still held that a statement
to a police officer at the scene was not "testimonial." Id. at 848 ("We will hold that the
statement to the police officer at the hospital was not testimonial because the interview was
not sufficiently analogous to a pretrial examination by a justice of the peace; among other
things, the police had not yet focused on a crime or a suspect, there was no structured
questioning, and the interview was informal and unrecorded.").
40 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
41 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). For an in-depth discussion of the Roberts
jurisprudence, see Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REv. 537,
575-91 (2003).
42 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63; Graham, supra note 29 (stating that in his writings, Wigmore
reduced the confrontation right to no more than "a right to cross-examine the witnesses the
prosecutor produced at trial").
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confrontation of particularly reliable evidence, in practice, there was no
absolute right to confront one's accuser under Roberts-only a right to
confront those witnesses whose hearsay statements did not seem
trustworthy to a trial judge.43
Crawford announced a paradigm shift, threatening to end the recent
practice in domestic violence prosecutions of relying on out-of-court
statements rather than live witnesses. Sylvia Crawford had implicated her
husband, Michael Crawford, in a killing and declined to take the stand,
44citing Washington's marital privilege. Her statements were introduced as
a statement against penal interest, an exception to the hearsay rules, and
because the judge found them particularly reliable, he admitted them as
evidence.4 5 The Supreme Court resolved the question of whether the absent
Ms. Crawford was a witness for Sixth Amendment purposes in the




43 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64-66 (noting that competing interests in effective law
enforcement and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence
applicable in criminal proceedings may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial in
certain instances. The Court concluded there is no need to confront evidence that bears
specific "indicia of reliability." Instead, reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.).
44 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36-40 (2004). The declarant, Ms. Crawford,
told police about a killing in which she and her husband were involved. Id. at 38-39. Her
statement named her husband as the person primarily responsible for the murder. Id. at 38.
At trial, the prosecutor sought to introduce this statement against the accused, Mr. Crawford,
even though Ms. Crawford was not available to testify. Id. at 40. The judge allowed the
statement to be introduced, finding it particularly reliable as a statement against penal
interest, an exception to the hearsay rules. Id. Ms. Crawford was the "witness" in the
Crawford trial, not the police officer who repeated her statement in court. Id. Her
statements operated like testimony at the trial and were the only eyewitness evidence against
the defendant. Id. Thus, she was the accuser at her husband's trial in the Sixth Amendment
sense. Had Ms. Crawford testified in person for the government, defense counsel would
have probed her bias through cross-examination, and may have been successful in
suggesting to the jury that she had every reason to minimize her own involvement in order to
avoid being charged with murder as well. Perhaps she would even have admitted that she
lied to save herself.
45 Id. at 40. Following the Roberts jurisprudence, Mr. Crawford's trial judge made the
determination that the declarant's statements were so reliable that cross-examination was
unnecessary to determine reliability. Id. The only witness the defense counsel could cross-
examine about the statement was the police officer who heard Ms. Crawford make the
statement but who would have been ignorant as to Ms. Crawford's motivation.
46 Id. at 53.




The key term in the Crawford decision is "testimonial. 48  In
Crawford, the concept of testimonial is intrinsically intertwined with the
concept of "witness." The terms witness and testimonial are flip sides of
the same coin in the new jurisprudence: because Ms. Crawford bore
testimony, she was the witness. Whether a statement was testimonial is the
same as asking whether the person who made the statement was a witness
against the defendant at the trial. However, the majority famously declined
to define its newly minted term "testimonial," except to say that "[v]arious
formulations of [the] core class of 'testimonial' statements exist" and
"[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to... police
interrogation" repeated at trial. 49 Although there are many ways to interpret
what the Court planned to accomplish with the word testimonial, one
interpretation is that it offers a functional approach to the term witness.
Under this definition, courts could no longer pretend that a witness is not a
witness just because he was not summoned to court, for his accusatory
statement could be repeated at trial under an exception to the hearsay
rules.
That was the promise of Crawford. No longer would changing
hearsay exceptions determine constitutional rights. No longer would a
judge determine that cross-examination of a witness was unnecessary
because her statement fell into a hearsay exception that was considered
particularly reliable. It was now the jury's role to determine the credibility
of the person who made the statement and the reliability of the statement.
Judges would no longer be empowered to remove the right to cross-
examine declarants just because the judges found their statements to be
reliable. Assuming the witness was available for trial, Crawford announced
that the Constitution required nothing less than cross-examination of that
witness for all testimonial statements.51
Despite this strong promise to reinvigorate the Confrontation Clause,
Crawford is flawed. The Crawford opinion pulls in two inconsistent
directions. In one direction is its demand for more face-to-face
confrontation.52 The case seeks to ensure that henceforth, juries will
determine reliability through observing direct and cross-examination of live
48 See, e.g., id. at 51-52.
41 Id. at 51, 68.
50 "Raleigh was, after all, perfectly free to confront those who read Cobham's confession
in court." Id. at 51.
51 Id. at 68. If the witness is unavailable, the Constitution allows prior testimony where
there was an opportunity for cross-examination.
52 Id. at 62.
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witnesses. 3 In the other direction, however, Crawford implies a narrow
reading of the Confrontation Clause where only some evidence that is the
equivalent of trial testimony will be deemed "testimonial," and all other
evidence against an accused will not even be governed by the Sixth
Amendment. 54 If the clause only applies to a narrow class of out-of-court
witness statements, then for all other out-of-court witness statements,
judges will continue to determine if the statement is so reliable that cross-
examination adds nothing for the factfinder.
The Court's goal of reinvigorating the Sixth Amendment can be
gleaned through numerous historical quotes that flow throughout the
Crawford opinion. "The common-law tradition is one of live testimony in
court subject to adversarial testing," the Court wrote. 55 The Crawford court
quoted a case decided in 1794, three years after the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment: "[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice,
that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to
cross examine. 56 The Court criticized Roberts for allowing a jury to hear
evidence "untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial
determination of reliability. '57 Instead, the Confrontation Clause "reflects a
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on
which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be
determined., 58 The majority opinion sounded a note of incredulity at the
state of the American criminal trial where police read in the statements of
witnesses because a judge decides they are reliable.59 When the majority
" Id. at 61-62 ("To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence,
but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of
reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability
can best be determined. Cf 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 373 (1768) ('This open examination of witnesses ... is much more conducive to
the clearing up of truth.')").
54 Id. at 68 ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the
Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law.").
55 Id. at 43 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 373-74).
56 Id. at 49 (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794)). Similarly, before
the Confrontation Clause was adopted, the complaint about one state's constitutional
convention was that it was still not determined whether an accused "is to be allowed to
confront the witnesses and have the advantage of cross examination." Id. at 48.
57 Id. at 62.
58 Id. at 61.
59 Id. at 66. For example:
Each of the courts also made assumptions that cross-examination might well have undermined.
The trial court, for example, stated that Sylvia Crawford's statement was reliable because she
was an eyewitness with direct knowledge of the events. But Sylvia at one point told the police
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wrote that "[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously
reliable is akin to dispensing with [a] jury trial because a defendant is
obviously guilty," 60 the Court condemned the practice of allowing judges to
determine reliability, a practice which deprived juries of their duty to make
determinations based on the jurors' own observations as to how witnesses
answer questions.
Through statements like these, the majority signaled its intent to
require juries rather than judges to determine credibility and to give juries
the traditional tools to make these determinations, namely through
observing the witness answer questions on direct and cross-examinations.
These broad pronouncements denote a Court bent on breathing new life into
a neglected constitutional right.
In contrast, there is plenty of language in the opinion that suggested
the Court was concerned primarily with the historical abuses that the
Framers of the Sixth Amendment probably had in mind when they penned
the clause near the end of the eighteenth century.6' When the Court listed
three possible core definitions of "testimonial" statements, the list was
made up primarily of formalized documents, for example, "extrajudicial
statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 62  These categories listed
types of statements by how they were assembled, rather than by taking a
functional approach to the statements to see if they became the functional
equivalent of testimony at trial.
Another way to frame Crawford's contradiction is by asking whether
the Confrontation Clause should look at historical rights or historical
abuses. Is the goal of the clause to give current criminal defendants the
same rights as they would have had when the Amendment was ratified, or
that she had "shut [her] eyes and.. . didn't really watch" part of the fight, and that she was "in
shock." The trial court also buttressed its reliability finding by claiming that Sylvia was "being
questioned by law enforcement, and, thus, the [questioner] is ... neutral to her and not someone
who would be inclined to advance her interests and shade her version of the truth unfavorably
toward the defendant." The Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could
be admitted against a criminal defendant because it was elicited by "neutral" government
officers. But even if the court's assessment of the officer's motives was accurate, it says nothing
about Sylvia's perception of her situation. Only cross-examination could reveal that.
Id. (citations removed).
60 Id. at 62.
61 Id. at 46, 51, 54, 56. But see John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant
Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1853-54 ("The history of the Confrontation Clause is
notoriously unilluminating .... Able Scholars have sifted through that history, with few
conclusive results.").
62 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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should the Confrontation Clause be interpreted only to prevent the
introduction of evidence that the Framers feared would be introduced?
Depending upon how the term "testimonial" is defined, these two
competing forces within Crawford may be irresolvable. After all, a narrow
interpretation of the term testimonial would cede much more discretion to
judges to make the type of reliability determinations of testimony that the
Court condemned.
Justice Thomas called for a narrow reading of the Sixth Amendment in
his concurrence in White v. Illinois,63 so that only abuses that were known
to the Framers from previous English experience with inquisitorial systems
would be considered "testimonial," meaning "extrajudicial
statements... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 64 Under Thomas'
viewpoint, new methods of introducing out-of-court statements, such as the
expanded excited utterance doctrine, would be peripheral to core
Confrontation Clause concerns because they were not "the abuses targeted
by the Confrontation Clause., 65 Although Justice Thomas called for such a
limited reading in his concurrence in White, Crawford did not follow this
path.66 Despite the focus on historical abuses, Crawford's majority
63 White, 502 U.S. at 365-66 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
64 Id. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
65 Justice Thomas interpreted the Confrontation Clause in White narrowly to apply only
to formal types of hearsay introduced during certain historical periods and condemned by the
Framers, such as "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-
52 (citing White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)). Justice Thomas broadened his narrow definition of testimonial in
Davis/Hammon a bit to include statements that the prosecution introduced in bad faith to
circumvent "the literal right of confrontation." See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266,
2283 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Still, Justice Thomas
dissented in the Hammon result because the statements made informally at the scene were
not the types of abuses the clause was intended to prevent: "The Court's determination that
the evidence against Hammon must be excluded extends the Confrontation Clause far
beyond the abuses it was intended to prevent." Id. at 2284 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Similarly, Thomas criticized the objective purpose test for being
"disconnected from the prosecutorial abuses targeted by the Confrontation Clause." Id. at
2283-84 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66 See discussion supra note 65. Although Scalia's majority opinion in Crawford listed
Justice Thomas' limited reading of the clause as one possible definition of testimonial,
elsewhere Scalia rejected this narrow reading, writing that the clause should be read to
prohibit not just the practices disapproved by the Framers, but also practices they would
have disapproved of if the hearsay practice had been known to them:
Any attempt to determine the application of a constitutional provision to a phenomenon that did
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resolved this issue by determining that the clause prohibits what the
Framers would have prohibited had they known it would come to pass, not
just what the Framers specifically feared at the time the clause was
drafted.67
Although Justice Thomas' narrow viewpoint did not prevail in
Crawford, state court decisions, such as Hammon and Davis, have pulled
out examples of core abuses from Crawford to conclude that the
Confrontation Clause only applies to formalized equivalents of testimony,
such as affidavits or recorded custodial interrogations, in order to justify the
introduction of statements without the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses.68 Davis/Hammon gave the Court a chance to revisit the
contradictions in Crawford and determine whether the new jurisprudence
would indeed bring back live witnesses or whether the new approach to the
Confrontation Clause would allow the government to continue to
circumvent the live witness requirement by training police to gather less
formal types of evidence.
If a narrow reading of testimonial prevailed, other accusations served
up as testimony at trial would be deemed not to be witness testimony, even
if the missing witness was the only eyewitness, the only source of the
accusation against the defendant. If the term "testimonial" was read
narrowly, then in most cases judges, not juries, would decide what is
reliable. At the heart of Crawford's inconsistency between its promise of
trials based on live witnesses subject to cross-examination and its tendency
to define testimonial statements narrowly lay the Court's implicit
assumption that the term "testimonial" should turn on how evidence was
gathered at trial rather than the role the evidence plays at trial. We must
examine Davis/Hammon to determine which strain of Crawford's message
prevailed: its promise of more confrontation of the witnesses against the
accused, or its suggestion that the clause applies only to those accusations
that were gathered in a particular manner.
not exist at the time of its adoption (here, allegedly, admissible unswom testimony) involves
some degree of estimation-what The Chief Justice calls use of a "proxy," ...- but that is
hardly a reason not to make the estimation as accurate as possible. Even if, as The Chief Justice
mistakenly asserts, there were no direct evidence of how the Sixth Amendment originally applied
to unswom testimony, there is no doubt what its application would have been.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n.3 (emphasis added) (citations removed).
67 Id. Justice Scalia, again writing for the majority in Davis/Hammon, affirmed the
reading of testimonial to include evidence not contemplated at the time of the Framers, thus
refuting Thomas' dissent: "Restricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against
which it was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction." Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.
68 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington,




IV. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE DA VIS/HAMMON DECISION
A. THE FACTS OF HAMMON AND DA VIS
In Hammon v. Indiana, police responded to a home minutes after a call
reporting domestic violence.69 There, police officers encountered Amy
Hammon who, when asked, first responded that nothing was wrong.
70
Inside the apartment, police found broken glass from a heater, and one
officer questioned Ms. Hammon again while the other officer tried to keep
her husband, Hershel Hammon, in another room, away from the alleged
victim. 7' This time, Ms. Hammon told the police that Mr. Hammon had
assaulted her.72 Before the police left, the officer had Ms. Hammon fill out
and sign a battery affidavit. 73 Although the complainant did not appear at
trial, the government successfully introduced her oral statement as an
excited utterance.74 The trial took place before the Supreme Court's
Crawford decision was announced, so the trial judge followed the rules set
forth in Roberts and White.75 The judge determined that the statement
constituted an "excited utterance," considered one of the deeply rooted
exceptions to the rule against hearsay, which made the statement inherently
reliable. 76 Therefore, before Crawford, direct and cross-examination of the
declarant in front of the jury was unnecessary to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause analysis.
After Crawford was decided, the Indiana Court of Appeals reviewed
Hammon and affirmed the conviction.77 The statements at issue were not
"testimonial," the court held, because they were gathered in an informal
manner.78 Unlike Crawford, where the interrogation took place in police
custody and was taped, the questioning in Hammon did not take place in the
police station, the interview was not recorded, and it was too unstructured
69 Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 446-47.
70 id.
71 Id. at 447.
72 Id.
73 id.
74 Id. The trial judge also allowed the witness' signed affidavit memorializing her
excited utterance as a "present sense impression." Id. On appeal, the government conceded
that the Confrontation Clause would apply to the written statement so that it should have
been excluded in the absence of the victim. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280
(2006).
75 See Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 829 N.E.2d
444 (Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
76 Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 448.
77 Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 953.
78 Id. at 952-53.
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to merit the term "interrogation. 79 On further appeal, the Indiana Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction.8" That court categorized the exchange
between the officer and the declarant as a "preliminary investigation" in
which the officer was responding to an emergency, so the oral declaration
was non-testimonial. 81 Although the admission of the written affidavit
violated the Confrontation Clause, the state court concluded that admitting
it was harmless error. The U.S. Supreme Court in Davis/Hammon
reversed the Indiana Supreme Court's decision.
In Davis v. Washington, the declarant called the emergency response
83number, hung up, and the operator called back. In answer to the
operator's questions, declarant Michelle McCottry told the operator that a
man was "jumpin' on me again., 84  The operator asked a number of
questions, including the identity of the alleged assailant. 5  To establish
Adrian Davis' identity, the operator asked for the last name of the alleged
assailant, then the first name, then his middle initial. The operator also
asked for Mr. Davis' date of birth.86 At one point, the declarant told the
operator that her assailant had left.87 Although further questioning occurred
after this, the answers to the later questions were not at issue on appeal to
the Supreme Court. 88 In the end, the operator decided to send a squad car to
find and arrest Mr. Davis before the police proceeded to the caller's
79 Id. at 952.
[W]e hold the statement A.H. gave to Officer Mooney was not a "testimonial" statement. It
appears to us that the common denominator underlying the Supreme Court's discussion of what
constitutes a "testimonial" statement is the official and formal quality of such a statement.
A.H.'s oral statement was not given in a formal setting even remotely resembling an inquiry
before King James I's Privy Council; it was not given during any type of pre-trial hearing or
deposition; it was not contained within a "formalized" document of any kind.... Whatever else
police "interrogation" might be, we do not believe that word applies to preliminary investigatory
questions asked at the scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred. Such interaction with
witnesses on the scene does not fit within a lay conception of police "interrogation," bolstered by
television, as encompassing an "interview" in a room at the stationhouse.
Id.
80 Hammon, 829 N.E.2d 444.
"' Id. at 457-58.
82 Id. at 459.
83 State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005), aff'd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Joint Appendix to the Petition of Certiorari at 10-11, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct.
2266 (2006) (No. 05-5224) [hereinafter Joint Appendix, Petition].
87 Davis, 111 P.3d at 846.
88 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277-78 ("[T]he Washington Supreme Court concluded that, even
if later parts of the call were testimonial, their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Davis does not challenge that holding, and we therefore assume it to be correct.").
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residence to get a further statement from the caller. 89 At Mr. Davis' trial,
the accuser did not appear, and the government played the recording of the
911 call after the judge determined that it was especially reliable under the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.90
Crawford was decided after the Washington Court of Appeals had
affirmed Mr. Davis' conviction but before the Washington Supreme Court
issued its ruling. 9 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
911 calls must be scrutinized to determine if the declarant made the call "to
be rescued from peril" or out of a desire to bear witness. 92 Initially the
purpose of Ms. McCottry's 911 call was "to be rescued from peril," and
therefore those statements were non-testimonial.93 Although the court
found some of the 911 call to be testimonial in nature, these later statements
constituted harmless error.94  The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
Washington Supreme Court's Davis decision.
B. DA VIS/HAMMON CREATES A TEST FOR TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
THAT IS VAGUE AND INCONSISTENT
1. Davis/Hammon Creates a Primary Purpose Test to Distinguish Between
Testimonial and Non-Testimonial Hearsay
The Davis/Hammon decision created a primary purpose test to
determine whether statements made in response to police questioning
constitute "testimony" under the Sixth Amendment-and are therefore not
admissible at trial without an opportunity to cross-examine the witness,
unless the trial judge finds that the defendant has forfeited his right by
wrongfully ensuring the witness' absence.95 Statements are "testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate. .. that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution., 96  However, the Davis/Hammon Court
89 Joint Appendix, Petition, supra note 86, at 11-13.
90 Davis, 111 P.3d at 847.
91 Id. The appeals court decision came down in 2003. State v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661, 665
(Wash. Ct. App. 2003), affd, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
92 Davis, 111 P.3d at 849.
93 id.
94 Id. at 851.
95 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006); see Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). See generally James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the
Misnamed Exception for "Forfeiture" by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1193,
1196 (2006) (arguing that forfeiture rule discussed in Crawford should have been named a
"waiver by wrong-doing").
96 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
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simultaneously carved out an exception to Crawford's holding that police
interrogations repeated at trial are clearly testimonial. The Court held that
statements are "non-testimonial" when "made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. 97
The Supreme Court held that the statements in Hammon were
testimonial and should have been excluded at trial, in the absence of a live
witness. 98 Although less formal than the interrogation in Crawford, the
questioning of Ms. Hammon nevertheless constituted interrogation.99 The
Court found no emergency in progress and concluded that the interrogation
was part of an investigation into past criminal conduct. "Objectively
viewed, the primary ... purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a
possible crime." 100 In essence, the Court decided that the declarant was a
witness under the Confrontation Clause, 10 1 which requires that the fact
finder be given the tools to determine the accuser's credibility based upon
live testimony or, if the witness was unavailable, through prior recorded
testimony where counsel was given an opportunity for cross-examination.
The Supreme Court resolved the Davis facts differently from those of
Hammon. The Court ruled that the trial judge in Davis was correct in
admitting much of the 911 call without a witness to cross-examine.
10
2
Statements given to the 911 operator before the declarant stated that the
assailant had left the home were not "testimonial.10 3 The primary purpose
of the early questions, including questions that sought to determine the
identity of the person the witness was accusing, was "to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency"' 0 4 and not "to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."' 0 5 The Court
assumed that the 911 operator served as an agent of the police. The Court
held that the questions and answers fell outside the purview of the Sixth
9' Id. at 2274.
98 Id. at 2278-80.
99 Id. at 2278.
1oo Id.
1o1 Id. at 2279-80.
102 Id. at 2276-78.
103 Id. at 2277-78. The Supreme Court agreed with the Washington Supreme Court that
Ms. McCottry's early statements identifying Mr. Davis as her assailant were not testimonial,
and stated that if later parts of the conversation were testimonial, then their admission was a
harmless error. Id. at 2278.
"o id. at 2277.
105 Id. at 2274.
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Amendment because of their emergency purpose, and therefore Davis did
not have a right to confront the person who accused him.1
0 6
Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter, complained that the Court had
created a fiction. 10 7  He criticized the Court's primary purpose test of
testimonial that requires a trial judge and appellate courts to assign a
dominant purpose to questions asked by the police when police may have
more than one motive for asking questions: 1
08
In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of a crime, whether
pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation,
viewed from the perspective of the police, are both to respond to the emergency
situation and to gather evidence.... Assigning one of these two "largely unverifiable
motives," . . . requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will rarely be
present-and is not reliably discernible. It will inevitably be, quite simply, an
exercise in fiction.
10 9
After Davis/Hammon, trial judges must determine the primary purpose
of the questioning that led to the incriminating statement that the
prosecution seeks to introduce sans witness. Judges are expected to
determine this objectively, looking at all the circumstances to find what a
reasonable police officer or a reasonable agent of the police would intend.
Answers to questions by police officers or agents "are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate ... that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution."'1 0 Statements are admissible without a witness if the
primary purpose of the questions that elicited the statements were to meet
an ongoing emergency."'
2. Davis/Hammon Creates a New Exercise in Ficton
There are many problems with the Court's reasoning in
Davis/Hammon. The new decision fails to give a satisfactory explanation
of why the two cases, Davis and Hammon, merit different results. The
opinion is confusing because it appears to recommend one method of
determining whether statements qualify for Sixth Amendment protection
while simultaneously basing its decision on other methods. Police and
prosecutors will be encouraged to alter their methods of gathering evidence
and describing the investigation in such a way that statements will be
106 Id. at 2274 & n.2.
107 Id. at 2280, 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108 Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).




deemed responses to emergency situations, which will result in fewer live
witnesses, contrary to Crawford's purpose in announcing a new
jurisprudence. Most problematic is the fact that the decision creates a
disconnect between what the terms "witness," "testimony," and
"testimonial" mean in the context of a trial and how the Court is using the
words.
How broadly or narrowly to interpret Davis/Hammon's emergency
exception is its chief ambiguity.1" 2  One reading is that the emergency
exception applies every time a police officer needs to know who to arrest
and how violent that person might be. If so, then this exception could take
care of the majority of witnessless prosecutions in domestic violence cases.
Another reading is that the emergency exception applies only to statements
made when the alleged victim says she is currently being abused and the
police are not there to protect her. If so, that is a much narrower reading of
the case that will require confrontation rights for all interviews at the scene
of the crime. However, it is difficult to know how the Court will eventually
resolve this ambiguity because the tests created by the Court to determine
whether a missing witness constitutes a witness under the Sixth
Amendment are fictional, unmoored from the concept of a witness at trial.
a. Excited Utterance Is a Legal Fiction
The more narrowly the Court defines the term testimonial, the more
admissibility of evidence against a defendant will be determined by hearsay
rules of that individual jurisdiction without any constitutional protection.
One article Richard Friedman wrote with Bridget McCormick describes the
dangers of abandoning the Confrontation Clause to the vagaries of hearsay:
Imagine a judicial system that advertised to the public as follows:
If you want to make a criminal accusation against a person, make the statement
however you wish and present it to us in a way that we can pass it on to the fact-
finder. If you want, you can make it in person to the fact-finder, but you don't
have to. You can make it on audio or video tape, you can make it in writing (no
need for a signature), you can make it by telephone (we've set up a special
number, 911, for just that purpose), or you can make it to any person you want,
with the request that he or she pass it on to us. And you don't have to take an oath.
In fact, if you want to do the whole thing anonymously, that's OK, too. We can
use the statement at trial however you make it.11T
112 See id. at 2273.
113 Friedman & McCormack, supra note 3, at 1247. In this quote, Friedman and
McCormack are also driving at the fact that the lack of formality should not make the
statements any less problematic from a Sixth Amendment perspective. "The lack of
formality would not make the statement less testimonial. Instead, the lack of formal
requirements would make this system for the creation of testimony appalling." Id. The
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One lower court bristled at this vision of hearsay unchecked by
constitutional supervision. 4  This would never happen, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals wrote, because the statements must satisfy a
rule of evidence to be admissible." 5 As Crawford recognized, the changing
rules of hearsay provided scant protection to the accused when the
government wished to introduce proof without a witness present. Nowhere
is this more apparent than the excited utterance or spontaneous declaration
exception to the hearsay rule.16
Hammon is a good example of how courts know that the excited
utterance is a fiction but they use it because it allows prosecutors to proceed
to trial in the absence of witnesses. Recall that excited utterances are
supposed to encompass only those statements where "self-interest could not
have been brought full to bear by reasoned reflection."'"17 In Hammon, the
declarant first tells the police officer at the scene that nothing happened, and
then once she is brought to another room away from the accused, she
explains what he did. 1 8 This is the normal action of a reasoning, rational
person capable of self-interest. The prosecutor's theory must have been that
the earlier denial was not true even though it was made under the
excitement of the startling event and before the later "excited utterance."
Hence, judges acting as gatekeepers may allow in a good deal of evidence
that is not especially reliable, and judges cannot be expected to screen in
only reliable hearsay, when the notion that excited people cannot fabricate
is simply a legal fiction.
authors also make the point that callers will eventually know that this system allows their
calls to serve as evidence at trial. They seek to exclude these witness statements because the
callers should know how their statements will be used, see id., while in this Article, I seek to
exclude these witness statements regardless of what the callers should know if the statements
would serve as accusations against the accused at trial and therefore constitute statements of
witnesses against the accused.
114 See Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 810 (D.C. 2005) (stating that Friedman
and McCormack's "parade of horribles" repeated by defense counsel, was "less than
convincing. After all, the Confrontation Clause is not the only safeguard against the
admission of out-of-court statements. Unless such statements fall within a recognized
hearsay exception, they continue to be inadmissible .....
115 Id.
116 The 911 call in Davis and the statement given at the scene in Hammon were both
introduced under this rule. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 449 (Ind. 2005), rev'd sub
nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006); State v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661, 664 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2003), affd, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), af'd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
117 See WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 1747.
118 Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), ajfd, 829 N.E.2d 444
(Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
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Scholars who have considered the psychological underpinnings of the
excited utterance have nearly universally criticized it. 119 Some of the
criticism has been aimed at the fact that trauma distorts understanding, and
other criticism has noted that the capacity to dissemble is not so easily
disturbed. 20 As Aviva Orenstein has written:
Today, Wigmore's description of the effect of stress seems primitive and one-sided.
His analysis of the effect of stress-that it stills conscious thought-undervalues other
factors in the complicated process of perception. From a functional as well as a
philosophical point of view, Wigmore's theory underestimates the vast cognitive
processes that transpire as part of any utterance. Even as a declarant spontaneously
yells, "MY GOD, the car ran the red light!" he is thinking, making choices, processing
images, translating those images, and choosing words. It is, therefore, hard to divine
what part of that complicated process is deliberate and what part is "instinctive" or
"impulsive."
1 2 1
Since the early 1900s, psychologists have found that statements would
have to be made simultaneously or virtually simultaneously with a
described event for any increased reliability. 122  When psychologists
measure hesitation in verbal responses to gauge the time it takes to falsify
answers, psychologists use fractions of seconds, not minutes. 123 Stanley
Goldman noted the existence of empirical studies "confirm[ing] that the
119 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 30; James D. Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay
Rule: The Fallacy of Res Gestae Reliability, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 203 (1995); Aviva
Orenstein, "MY GOD! ": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REv. 159, 180 (1997) ("For decades, scholars have attacked the
wisdom of fashioning an exception to the hearsay rule that depends upon the excited and
stressful state of the speaker.").
120 See Goldman, supra note 30, at 460-62; Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 23, at 436-
37.
121 Orenstein, supra note 119, at 178; see also id. at 178 n.70 (citing CHARLES G.
MORRIS, PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 232-38 (9th ed. 1996) (discussing "sensation,
perception, encoding, and retrieval")).
Q22 Herbert Sidney Langfield, Psycho-Physical Symptoms of Deception, 15 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCH. 319 (1920); William Moulton Marston, Reaction Time Symptoms of Deception, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 72 (1920); see Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions
Cannot Live In The Past, 28 FLA ST. U. L. REv. 907, 916-17 (2001). McFarland wrote about
another hearsay rule derived from res gestae, the present sense impression, but the scientific
issues are the same:
Two relatively recent studies confirm that response latency, that is, the time between the event
and the statement, can be less than one second for a lie. One research team reported the
following response latency times: for a previously prepared lie, .8029 seconds; for a truthful
statement, 1.6556 seconds; and for a spontaneous lie, 2.967 seconds. That means the truth took
longer to get out than a previously conceived lie, and that even a lie fabricated on the spur of the
moment required less than three seconds to create and utter.
Id. (footnote omitted).
123 BuRTr, supra note 30, at 71-76.
[Vol. 97
AFTER CRAWFORD
danger of fabrication is decreased where only a matter of seconds or
fractions of seconds separate a particular event and an individual's
description of that event," but proving no particular reliability "once the
number of seconds has increased even slightly."' 2 4 Wigmore's decoupling
of the excited utterance from res gestae and his emphasis on excitement
rather than timing was based on inaccurate science even at the time.
In practice, judges have stretched the timing of the excited utterance
well past any near-simultaneous event. Judges have qualified statements as
excited utterances hours after the underlying event. 12 5 Police may report to
judges that a witness seemed agitated, still under the shock of the exciting
event and then describe witnesses the officers had never met before and
events the officers only know about because the witness told them. In turn,
trial judges find that statements like the ones in Hammon and Davis must be
truthful because the witnesses had no opportunity to fabricate their
responses to the police. When judges admit statements under the excited
utterance exception-typically statements made to police arriving at the
scene ten minutes or more after the event was completed-judges are not
basing their decision on science at all. Rather, judges are knowingly
employing Wigmore's fictional construct.
2 6
Although the reversal of the Hammon conviction appeared to signal a
reaffirmation of Crawford's bold emphasis on live testimony, we may soon
marvel at how quickly another fiction was created to accompany the excited
utterance fiction. Davis/Hammon simply invites judges to apply a second
layer of fiction on top of the excited utterance fiction. The Supreme Court
is scornful of the notion that constitutional rights could turn on how police
investigations are carried out or described, but the Court should consider
how manipulation has succeeded in the excited utterance context to avoid
live witness testimony.127 Judges that ruled that statements like the ones in
124 Goldman, supra note 30, at 460 nn.62-63 (citing Teree E. Foster, Present Sense
Impressions: An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 315 (1979)); Hutchins &
Slesinger, supra note 23, at 436-37. See generally Charles W. Quick, Hearsay, Excitement,
Necessity and the Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REv. 204
(1960).
125 See supra note 33 for collected cases.
126 For example, in the case described in Section II, supra, the judge expressed disinterest
in a memorandum submitted by students arguing that scientists think that statements made
under the excitement of an event do not really prevent a person from lying. I have found no
case where a judge or court excluded an excited utterance based on scientific evidence of the
statement's potential unreliability.
127 The Court stated in Davis/Hammon that: "The Confrontation Clause in no way
governs police conduct, because it is the trial use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex
parte testimonial statements which offends that provision.... [T]estimonial statements are
what they are," thereby denying the possibility of manipulation by police. 126 S. Ct. 2266,
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Hammon and Davis must be truthful because fabrication is physically
impossible are likely also to find that an officer's primary purpose in taking
the statement was "to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency."1
28
In contravention of Crawford, the Court allowed the Davis trial judge
to decide that a witness' statement was sufficiently reliable that cross-
examination was unnecessary. In Davis, the judge decided that the witness
against Davis need not come to court because her initial statement was
inherently reliable, so the jury would gain little from viewing her testify
live, 129 and the Supreme Court affirmed the judge's ability to make this
call.' 30 In fact, one might say that the Court made it easier for prosecutors
to introduce statements against the accused because it did away with the
reliability test, or at least deleted the test from the Confrontation Clause.
Roberts and its progeny set a reliable standard for hearsay evidence that,
although roundly criticized, at least purported to provide protections to
criminal defendants from unreliable statements. Eliminating Roberts
entirely from its post-Crawford jurisprudence, the Court wrote:
We must decide, therefore, whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to
testimonial hearsay; and, if so, whether the recording of a 911 call qualifies .... A
limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be
said to mark out not merely its "core," but its perimeter.
13 '
In other words, once the Court concluded that the Davis hearsay was
not testimonial, then it did not need to decide whether or not the statements
were particularly reliable. Thus unreliable statements repeated at trial do
not offend the Confrontation Clause, only testimonial statements do. Citing
Davis/Hammon, future lower courts may decide that statements to 911
operators and to police at the scene are not testimonial, and then use the
hearsay rules to decide that such a statement is so reliable that cross-
examination is unnecessary. In the future, hearsay rules may be altered to
allow statements to be admitted without a judge determining reliability and
without offending the Sixth Amendment. 1
32
2279 (2006).
128 Id. at 2274.
129 Id. at 2271.
130 Id. at 2277.
131 The Court explicitly wrote in Davis/Hammon that Crawford overruled Roberts. Id. at
2275 n.4. ("Roberts condition[ed] the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on whether it
falls under a 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' or bears 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.' We overruled Roberts in Crawford by restoring the unavailability and
cross-examination requirements.") (citations omitted).
132 As an alternative, Professor Taslitz suggests a residual due process analysis of
testimonial statements separate from the Confrontation Clause. This approach may provide
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With reliability determinations banished, there is all the more reason
for the Court to make sure that it is not defining testimonial too narrowly.
It becomes exceedingly important that the Court not eliminate statements
that a jury might evaluate differently if it heard the witness answer
questions on the stand, statements where credibility determinations would
make a difference between a guilty verdict and a not guilty verdict.
b. Reasoning and the Four Part Test
The primary problem with the Davis/Hammon decision is that its
reasoning conflicts with the test it claims to set forth. Although the primary
purpose test sounds like the Court is basing its decision on the intent of the
police, the Court's primary purpose test is hardly straightforward.
Inexplicably, the Court combines the intent of the officer with the state of
mind of the declarant and the formality of the questioning, setting forth a
four-part distinction between the testimonial statements in Crawford and
the non-testimonial ones in Davis.
The Court names four differences between the statements in Davis and
those in Crawford that signify that the accusations against Davis are exempt
from the Confrontation Clause. 33 Note that only one of the factors named
seems to consider the officer's intent (the third one). The factors that the
Court finds persuasive are:
1. Immediacy: unlike Crawford, the declarant in Davis "was
speaking about events as they were actually happening .... 134
2. State of mind of the declarant: the phone call in Davis "was
plainly a call for help against bona fide physical threat."'35 (Note that
the Court assumed the truth of the matter asserted despite the lack of
cross-examination to determine credibility.)
3. Objective intent of the questioner: "the nature of what was asked
and answered in Davis, again viewed objectively, was such that the
some protection for non-core testimony where the witness/declarant is absent. Andrew
Taslitz, What Remains of Reliability: Hearsay and Freestanding Due Process after Crawford
v. Washington, 20 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2005, at 39, 39. The Supreme Court did not
mention any due process or reliability analysis in its opinion in Crawford or in
Davis/Hammon. However, that does not mean that the Court might not carve out such an
exception if it wished. Davis/Hammon was not the right case because the Court clearly
viewed the evidence as particularly reliable. 126 S. Ct. at 2277. The Court even discusses
the facts in Davis by assuming that what the declarant told the operator was true. Id. at
2276.
' Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-77.




elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present
,,136
emergency ....
4. Formality: the Davis interview was less formal than the one in
Crawford.
137
Despite Davis' holding that what is testimonial turns on the objective
primary intent of the officer gathering the information, this inquiry is only
one factor out of four in the Court's reasoning. The test includes many
other alternative factors, making it difficult to pin down the Court's new
test and easier for the Court to avoid having to deal with the problems
integral to each factor set forth. Simultaneously, the multiple factors will
make it easier for future judges and prosecutors to differentiate any new
interrogation evidence from the testimonial evidence in Crawford. Thus,
the government can now harness all these factors-the declarant's state of
mind, formality, immediacy, as well the officer's intent-to deny
confrontation rights.
c. "State of Mind of the Speaker" Rationale Was Originally Meant to
Ensure More Confrontation
Although Davis held that the test for determining "testimonial" turned
on the objective intent of the officer, the Court's discussion of the 911
statements in Davis primarily emphasizes the state of mind of the declarant
when she made the phone call. The state of mind rationale sets forth a
different test for determining whether it is within the scope of the
Confrontation Clause than the intent of the officer or intent of the person
taking down the statement. Instead of examining the police or the 911
operator's purpose in asking questions, the intent of the officer test looks at
the declarant's purpose in making the statement.
Ms. McCottry's emergency call in Davis was a cry for help, the Court
explained, evoking the state of mind test for determining what is
"testimonial."'138 "No 'witness' goes into court to proclaim an emergency
and seek help," declared the Court.139 By classifying Ms. McCottry's
phone call as a cry for help, the Court implied that statements fall outside
the scope of the Confrontation Clause when a declarant makes a statement
not knowing that her statement will be used to help prosecute the defendant,
or at least without this as the speaker's primary motivation.
136 id.
137 Id. at 2276-77.




In Crawford, the state of mind theory of testimonial appeared as one of
three possible definitions of core testimonial statements. The Crawford
Court said one possible core definition was "statements that were made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial," citing
to the amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL). 140  That brief intended that all statements to police
would be testimonial since the person making an accusatory statement
would have reason to believe that the statement would be used to charge or
prosecute someone for the crime. 14 1 The goal of the proposed state of mind
test was to expand the Confrontation Clause beyond statements to police in
order to include statements to non-government officials where the witness
knew these statements would be repeated at trial. In contrast, the
Washington Supreme Court and now the U.S. Supreme Court employed the
state of mind reasoning to take away Confrontation Clause protections from
statements made to agents of the police.
142
It is not clear whether the state of mind test exempts statements when
the declarant knows that he is getting someone into trouble with the police
but does not realize that the statement will actually be used at trial.
Crawford described the core theory as statements the witness would
reasonably believe were "available for use at a later trial.' 43 Many state
courts, including Washington's highest court in Davis, have used the words
"available for use at a later trial" literally to exempt many statements made
to 911 operators or at the scene to police officers, because the witness most
likely would not have known whether his accusation would be repeated at
trial.144 In contrast, the NACDL brief used the phrase "available for use at a
later trial" synonymously with these other phrases: "will lead the State to
punish the accused person"; "condemn the accused as a criminal and
restrain his or her liberty"; and the statement was "aimed at law
140 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004); see Brief for The Nat'l Ass'n of
Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S.
36 (No. 02-9410) [hereinafter NACDL Brief, Crawford].
141 NACDL Brief, Crawford, supra note 140, at 3.
142 State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (noting
that there was no evidence that Ms. McCottry knew her 911 call would later be used to
prosecute Mr. Davis or that it influenced her decision to call 911).
143 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
144 Davis, 111 P.3d at 850 ("[S]tatements made without reflection or deliberation are not
made in contemplation of their 'testimonial' use in a future trial." (quoting People v. Corella,
18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004))); id. at 851 ("There is no evidence McCottry
sought to 'bear witness' in contemplation of legal proceedings.").
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enforcement. 1 45 A more commonsense question, and one in keeping with
its genesis in the NACDL brief, is whether it is reasonable to expect that the
information will be used against the accused in some way by law
enforcement.
Ms. McCottry may have known that naming Mr. Davis would result in
arrest and prosecution. However, it is difficult for the Court to ascertain
what Ms. McCottry's intent was, since she was not on the stand to explain
her motivations and be cross-examined about them. The operator told Ms.
McCottry during the conversation that she was sending out a cruiser to
arrest the man the caller fingered, and the caller did not object or express
any surprise. 146 While people dialing 911 may not know the exact use their
statements will be put to, generally people know that it is a method to
summon the police and will likely result in arrest or prosecution. This state
of mind factor also invites judges to partake in an exercise in fiction.
The Court's conclusion that the statements given to the 911 operator in
Davis were different from what a witness does in court ignores the fact that
the questions and answers regarding the identity of the alleged perpetrator
in Davis sound very much like what a witness does on the stand: "Please
state the last name of the person who did this to you." "Please state his first
name." "What's his date of birth?"'' 47  That sounds more like in-court
testimony than a "girl's screams for aid as she was being chased by her
assailant."' 148 Furthermore, when the Court writes that no witness goes into
14' NACDL Brief, Crawford, supra note 140, at 24-25.
By and large statements made to law enforcement officials about a crime will be testimonial.
And by and large, statements made to friends, relatives, accomplices or anyone outside of
criminal justice system will not be testimonial.
There will be exceptions to these broad and general rules, of course. A witness to a crime may
make a statement to a friend knowing that the friend will subsequently contact police. Such a
statement is aimed at law enforcement and would therefore be testimonial.
Id. at 25 (emphasis added); see also Brief for The Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et
al. Supporting Petitioner, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (No. 05-5224); Brief
for The Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers and The Pub. Defenders Serv. for D.C.
Supporting Petitioner, Hammon v. Indiana, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5705).
146 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5224)
[hereinafter Transcript, Davis]. Ms. McCottry also declined an ambulance. Joint Appendix,
supra note 86, at 10.
147 See Joint Appendix, supra note 86, at 8-13.
148 See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277:
Davis seeks to cast McCottry in the unlikely role of a witness by pointing to English cases.
None of them involves statements made during an ongoing emergency. In King v. Brasier, for
example, a young rape victim, "immediately on her coming home, told all the circumstances of
the injury" to her mother. The case would be helpful to Davis if the relevant statement had been
the girl's screams for aid as she was being chased by her assailant. But by the time the victim
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court to proclaim an emergency and seek help, the Court overlooks
restraining order requests where people, particularly women, seek
protection from their abusers through temporary and permanent orders.
Every week in this country, thousands of people file into court seeking
emergency protection from their abusers. 149  Although many restraining
order requests could be categorized as a cry for help, the witnesses know
that their words will be used against the person they name. Like Ms.
McCottry, they may be asked the last name of the person whom they
accuse, the first name, and the suspect's date of birth. Thus, the only real
difference between the restraining order cases and Ms. McCottry's 911 call
is that she "was speaking about events as they were actually happening,"' 
50
assuming that the caller was telling the truth. Immediacy is the first prong
in the test the majority uses, but it is only one of three prongs. The fact that
the Court sets forth these other prongs makes it unlikely that the Court
intended to carve out only a narrow exception, even though the immediacy
factor would constitute a narrow exception to the Confrontation Clause less
vulnerable to manipulation.
The Washington court used the state of mind test in determining that
the 911 call in Davis was non-testimonial. 15' Brushing aside the argument
that the caller "reasonably knew her 911 call would later be used to
prosecute Davis," the Davis court placed the burden on the defense to prove
actual intent, concluding that "there is no evidence that McCottry had such
knowledge or that it influenced her decision to call 911.,,152 The Supreme
Court uses the "call for help" language without fully analyzing the state of
mind test. By burying the state of mind factor within the primary purpose
test, the Supreme Court in Davis sidesteps the appeals court's burden-
got home, her story was an account of past events.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations removed).
149 All fifty states have laws allowing judges to issue temporary and permanent
restraining orders. It is estimated that approximately 850,000 final restraining orders are
issued in the United States every year (approximately 342 orders per 100,000 persons), and
the number of temporary restraining orders is much greater. See Neal Miller, Inst. for Law
and Justice, What Does Research and Evaluations Say About Domestic Violence Laws? A
Compendium of Justice System Laws and Related Research Assessments 40 n. 110 (2005)
(draft manuscript), available at http://www.ilj.org/publications/dv/DomesticViolence
LegislationEvaluation.pdf (citing to Virginia, where permanent restraining orders accounted
for only 16% of the total number of restraining orders). While over 600,000 permanent
restraining orders are entered into the national registry, the FBI National Crime Information
Center (NCIC), many states either do not participate in the NCIC registry or their
participation is incomplete. Id.
"So Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276.
151 State v. Davis, Ill P.3d 844, 849 (Wash. 2005), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
152 Id. at 850 (emphasis added).
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shifting error and avoids the pretense that callers have no idea that 911 calls
instigate prosecution.
The Indiana appeals court in Hammon also used the state of mind test
as a runner-up theory to formality to explain why confrontation
requirements were unnecessary. The appeals court hinted that perhaps all
excited utterances are non-testimonial:
We further note that the very concept of an "excited utterance" is such that it is
difficult to perceive how such a statement could ever be testimonial. The underlying
rationale of the excited utterance exception is that such a declaration from one who
has recently suffered an overpowering experience is likely to be truthful. To be
admissible, an excited utterance "must be unrehearsed and made while still under the
stress of excitement from the startling event." . . . An unrehearsed statement made
without time for reflection or deliberation, as required to be an "excited utterance," is
not "testimonial" in that such a statement, by definition, has not been made in
contemplation of its use in a future trial.
153
Post-Crawford, the state of mind exception threatened to take away
confrontation rights from all cases where a judge concluded that the
evidence fit the excited utterance exception. The Davis/Hammon Court's
"cry for help" language is similar to the excited utterance definition that
statements made without time for reflection or deliberation are not
testimonial. After Davis/Hammon, what is there to stop a lower court from
concluding that statements like the one made at the scene in Hammon
represent a cry for help?
It is hard to reconcile the state of mind factor with the Crawford
decision, for the Supreme Court never applied the state of mind test to Ms.
Crawford's statement to police. The Crawford decision labeled Ms.
Crawford's statements testimonial because they were in response to police
interrogation; the Court did not write that in speaking to the police, the
defendant's wife was motivated by a desire to prosecute her husband, nor
did the Court mention that a reasonable person in her situation would have
known her statement would come in against him at trial. Neither does
Crawford order the trial court to make these factual determinations on
remand. 
54
153 Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 829 N.E.2d
444 (Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (quoting
Hardiman v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind. 2000)) (emphasis added) (citations
removed).
154 Crawford was remanded to the trial court to determine what the trial court should do
given that Ms. Crawford's statements were improperly admitted in violation of the
Confrontation Clause. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004). The issue of
harmless error was a possible avenue for the lower courts, but not a decision that the
statement was in fact non-testimonial, because Ms. Crawford's primary motivation in
making the statement was not to help prosecute her husband.
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The state of mind test was therefore not pronounced in Crawford as a
limitation upon statements that were otherwise testimonial. In addition, it is
not clear what a court would decide if it applied the state of mind exception
to Ms. Crawford. Would she have known that the statement would be
"available for use at a later trial?" Bruton v. United States, decided in 1968,
had augmented the rule that the admission of an accomplice cannot come in
against the defendant by requiring severance of the defendant's case from
the accomplice whenever a confession or admission against the accomplice
will implicate a co-defendant.' 55 A layperson such as Ms. Crawford could
hardly be expected to know that the long-established Bruton rule was being
replaced in some jurisdictions by a new "interlocking confessions" rule that
Crawford itself roundly rejected as a misinterpretation of Supreme Court
precedent. '56
By switching to the intent of the officer test instead of fully applying
the state of mind test, the Court avoids the central inconvenience with the
state of mind exception: namely, that most people know that when they talk
to 911 operators their answers will be used against those that they are
accusing of criminal behavior.
d. "Intent of the Officer" Rationale Allows Manipulation by Police
The primary purpose test awards confrontation rights based on the
intent of the officer asking questions. It allows police officers to structure
their questioning in order to maximize the chances that the evidence will be
introduced. The majority disliked the notion that confrontation rights could
be manipulated by police procedures. "The Confrontation Clause in no way
governs police conduct, because it is the trial use of, not the investigatory
collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which offends that
provision.... [T]estimonial statements are what they are."'157 According to
the majority, facts are facts, and there is no way that the police can alter the
facts to allow evidence that evades the constitutional guarantee.
The majority used the term "objective" to modify "intent" in an effort
to prevent police from depriving defendants of face-to-face confrontation.
Yet, the resolution of Hammon turned on the police officer's subjective
intent as evidenced by the officer's own words. The "interrogation was part
of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct-as, indeed, the
testifying officer expressly acknowledged,"'158 the majority wrote regarding
155 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136-37 (1968).
156 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (discussing the misreading of Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,
(1986)). Crawford also cites Bruton with approval. Id. at 57.
157 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 n.6 (2006).
158 Id. at 2278 (emphasis added).
2006]
JOSEPHINE ROSS
the officer's questioning of the victim at the scene. Words like
"investigate" could easily be avoided in future situations similar to
Hammon, and in its place the phrase "wanting to know whether I would be
encountering a violent criminal" could be asserted.
Police officers responding to a scene after the Davis/Hammon decision
will be careful to note all the ways that their call could be interpreted as an
emergency response to an ongoing situation. Instead of asking "what
happened," they will ask "what is happening?" Instead of letting things
calm down before gathering important details, the officers will talk to the
parties early on, before the situation is clear. When the officers come to
court, they will speak of ongoing emergencies, not past investigations, and
about their need to know the identity and violent tendencies of the person
they are arresting. It will be easy for police to make these changes in their
testimony because officers ask questions for multiple reasons-they will
merely need to pay more attention to one of these reasons. In addition,
since memory is self-serving, details that help their goal of admitting the
powerful evidence will spring to mind.' 59 With these changes, judges may
decide a case with facts identical to Hammon and come out with the
opposite result, determining that the primary purpose was not to investigate
past conduct so the Confrontation Clause would not apply.
Although the Davis/Hammon majority seemed not to believe that
police can structure their testimony to convince a judge that evidence is
non-testimonial, consider the recommendations of Cindy Dyer, the chief
prosecutor of the Family Domestic Violence Unit in Dallas.' 60 The chief
prosecutor recommends that police answer the following questions during a
hearing:
Were the statements taken "during the course of an interrogation"?
What was the purpose of your questions?
Were your questions to her an interrogation or merely part of your initial
investigation?
Were these questions asked to determine if a crime had even occurred?
161
The purpose of Dyer's questions is to convince a judge to allow the
introduction of incriminating hearsay statements. 162 These guidelines help
159 STEFAN H. KRIEGER ET AL., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 134 (1999).
160 Cindy Dyer, Chief of the Family Domestic Violence Unit in Dallas, as quoted in The






the officer fit his response into the exception to the Confrontation Clause
and permit the evidence to be introduced regardless of the declarant's
appearance at trial.
Good police work would entail following Dyer's suggestions above,
changing practices to ensure that evidence is introduced and to ensure that
cases are not dismissed for a lack of witnesses. 163  Every successful
alteration by prosecutors and police means fewer live witnesses and more
trials that are nothing more than police reciting out-of-court statements.
This is the dilemma created by the Crawford and Davis/Hammon decisions.
The cause of the dilemma is the definition of testimonial. An accused
should be able to confront his accuser and challenge the credibility of the
witness against him, whether or not the statements were uttered in response
to questions designed to help the police decide whom they should arrest and
whether or not the man or woman they arrest may be violent. Changing the
way a police officer discusses a crime scene and the motives for gathering
incriminating evidence does not change the fact that the defendant is being
prosecuted based on statements made by his or her accuser with no
opportunity for the fact finder to determine the credibility of the accuser.
e. The Majority's Formality Rationale Ignores the Fact that Questioning in
Hammon Was Less Formal than in Davis
Davis/Hammon provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
reject the formality litmus test that the lower courts were using to affirm the
denial of confrontation rights. Crawford had confused its readers by using
the term interrogation, which implies formality, while noting that "[w]e use
the term 'interrogation' in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal,
sense." 164 Instead of rejecting the formality test, Davis/Hammon sent mixed
messages.
162 See also Adam M. Krischer, "Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid";
Applying Common Sense to Crawford v. Washington in Domestic Violence Cases, VOICE,
Nov. 2004, at 1, 10, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/library/spotlight/
confrontationclause/otherauthorities/articles/thevoice.pdf; Sample Crawford Predicate
Questions, VOICE, Nov. 2004, at 8, 8-9, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/library/
spotlight/confrontationclause/otherauthorities/articles/thevoice.pdf.
163 See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 47 & n.192 (2006)
(noting that "prosecutors are trained to draft DV complaints using hearsay exceptions, such
as the victim's excited utterances at the scene" and that "[t]his drafting practice will
undoubtedly have to be modified after Davis v. Washington").
164 Id. at 53 n.4 ("Just as various definitions of 'testimonial' exist, one can imagine
various definitions of 'interrogation,' and we need not select among them in this case.
Sylvia's recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police questioning,
qualifies under any conceivable definition.").
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On the one hand, the Supreme Court reversed the Indiana court in
Hammon, sending a signal that informality did not bar application of the
Confrontation Clause. 165  The Indiana appeals court's Hammon decision
was one of the earlier pioneers of the formality approach. 166 According to
the Indiana appeals court, statements given to police with minimal
questioning, such as the questioning at the scene in Hammon, are not the
formal interrogations encompassed by the Crawford decision.167 The court
pointed to the fact that, unlike the Crawford case, the alleged victim was
not in custody when the police questioned her but was questioned at the
scene in response to an emergency call. 168 Indeed, the police questioning in
Hammon was open ended, unlike the measured question and answer method
employed during a direct examination at trial, a deposition, or a formal
interrogation. 1
69
On the other hand, formality is one of the four factors the
Davis/Hammon Court named in explaining why the 911 call in Davis fell
outside of Confrontation Clause guarantees. 170 Moreover, the Court wrote:
"We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial
utterance.' 17 1  Thus, despite the fact that Davis/Hammon reversed the
Indiana court, formality lives on. The new decision affirmed its colloquial
definition of interrogation, finding that the term interrogation is broad
enough to cover less formal questioning by police outside the stationhouse
without a recording or note taking. 172  Yet, one way to understand the
165 See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006).
166 Hammon has been widely followed. See, e.g., State v. Alvarez, 107 P.3d 350 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2005). Over a third of the states used the formality reasoning found in Hammon to
deny application of the Confrontation Clause. See Josephine Ross, Crawford's Short-Lived
Revolution: How Washington v. Davis Reins In Crawford's Reach, 83 N.D. L. REv.
(publication pending Spring 2007).
167 Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), afPd, 829 N.E.2d 444
(Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
168 Id.
169 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v.
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) ("Officer Richard remained with Hershel in the kitchen
while Mooney returned to the porch and again asked Amy what had occurred.").
170 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2269 ("Finally, the difference in the level of formality is striking.
Crawford calmly answered questions at a station house, with an officer-interrogator taping
and taking notes, while McCottry's frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an
environment that was not tranquil, or even safe.").
171 Id. at 2278 n.5 ("We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial
utterance. But we no longer have examining Marian magistrates; and we do have, as our
18th-century forebears did not, examining police officers ... who perform investigative and
testimonial functions once performed by examining Marian magistrates.") (citations
removed).
172 Id. at 2278.
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emergency exception created by Davis/Hammon is that questioning in
emergency responses is less formal than interrogations, where the police try
to prove past events for later criminal prosecution. Emergency questioning
is not like "extrajudicial statements contained in formalized 'testimonial'
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions"
that constituted the type of evidence targeted by the Framers because that
was the type of statement that was allowed in without confrontation in the
era leading up to the creation of the Sixth Amendment. 1
73
It is hard to reconcile the divergent results in Hammon and Davis using
the formality approach. The statements given to the 911 operator in Davis
are less formal than the questioning in Crawford and therefore merit a
different result, reasoned the Davis/Hammon Court. But the interrogation
in Hammon is also less formal than the interrogation in Crawford.
Ironically, the interrogation in Hammon is even less formal than the
interrogation in Davis,17 4 yet this informality did not benefit the
prosecution.
In Hammon, the police arrived at the scene and were trying to take a
statement from the declarant when the alleged abuser was in the same house
and kept trying to interrupt. 175 Unlike Davis, the statement in Hammon was
not taped. Although the police eventually asked the declarant to write an
affidavit, the officer may not have taken notes during the initial stage of
questioning.176 Indeed, the officer in Hammon may only have asked "What
happened?" in comparison with the 911 operator in Davis who asked thirty-
six detailed questions. 77 If the fact that there was less formality in the
173 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (citing White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
174 See infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text.
175 Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 947-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 829 N.E.2d
444 (Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006); see also Brief
of Respondent (State of Indiana) at 4, Hammon v. Indiana, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-
5705) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent (State of Indiana), Hammon] ("Officer Mooney also
testified that Hershel tried at least twice to enter the living room, and that each time Amy
became quiet, 'almost afraid to speak."') (citation omitted).
176 The government's brief in Hammon lays out what occurred during the conversation
between Officer Mooney and the victim, Ms. Hammon, that took place in the living room.
Brief of Respondent (State of Indiana), Hammon, supra note 175, at 2-4. There is no
mention in the brief of police taking notes when the oral statement was provided. The brief
for Petitioner Hammon does not claim otherwise. See Brief of Petitioner Hammon, Davis,
126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5705) [hereinafter Brief of Petititioner Hammon]. Rather, the
petitioner's brief focused on the affidavit that the officer asked the alleged victim to
complete and sign. Id. at 2 ("The affidavit was on a prepared fill-in-the-blank form that
Mooney apparently had with him and that tracked the language of the battery statute,....").
177 Joint Appendix, supra note 86, at 8-13; see also Brief of Respondent (State of
Indiana), Hammon, supra note 175, at 12 ("[Ms. Hammon] was obviously frightened and
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Davis questioning than in Crawford supports the conclusion that the Davis
evidence was not testimonial, then a fortiori it should support a similar
conclusion in Hammon. However, the Court's formality prong in
Davis/Hammon simply does not square with its decision on the Hammon
facts.
In reversing the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Hammon, the
Supreme Court used logic that could have applied equally to the facts of
Mr. Davis' case. Although interrogation in Hammon is less formal than in
Crawford, the questioning is formal enough, for it "imports sufficient
formality, in our view, that lies to such officers are criminal offenses." 178 In
other words, because witnesses may be charged for making false
accusations, their statements are sufficiently formal. However, the Court
ignores the fact that the alleged victim in Davis would also be subject to
criminal offense if she lied in her call to the 911 operator.
179
Professor Friedman has cogently argued against what he calls the
"formality bugaboo." 180 Formality is precisely what the Sixth Amendment
requires, he explained. 181 Swearing an oath, taking the stand, and being
subject to cross-examination are all formalities required by the Sixth
Amendment.' 82 Yet, evidence does not become more trustworthy the less
formal it gets. The statements permitted into evidence in Crawford were
faulty precisely because they lacked this formality. Hence, courts
misinterpret Crawford and the Sixth Amendment when they read a
formality requirement into the opinion.'
83
Historically, most crimes were privately prosecuted, and "there was
nothing resembling our modem police force," yet the right to confrontation
was guaranteed. 184  Therefore, Friedman argued, a statement may be
Officer Mooney took more action because he was concerned for her safety. The transcript
does not show any further questioning, but even if some minimal questioning did occur,
there is no evidence of any sort of 'interrogation."')
178 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.
179 See, e.g., City of Yakima v. Irwin, 851 P.2d 724, 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)
(affirming conviction based on false 911 call by citing city ordinance that provides in
relevant part: "It is unlawful for any person to cause or make any willfully untrue, false,
misleading, unfounded or exaggerated statement or report to the police department.").
180 Posting of Richard D. Friedman, The Formality Bugaboo, to The Confrontation Blog,
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/0 1/formality-bugaboo.html (Jan. 2, 2005, 12:55
p.m.).
181 Id.; see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 3, at 1246-47.
182 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
183 See Brief of Petitioner Hammon, supra note 176.
184 Id. at 16 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 67 (1993)). The Hammon brief submitted by Richard Friedman expands on this
point, that history shows that you do not need police questioning in the production of the
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testimonial even if the government had no part in its creation. 185 Indeed,
Crawford recognized Friedman's point that informal statements, such as
unsworn hearsay, while less formal than sworn statements, were equally
important to the Sixth Amendment:
But even if, as [the Chief Justice] claims, a general bar on unsworn hearsay made
application of the Confrontation Clause to unsworn testimonial statements a moot
point, that would merely change our focus from direct evidence of original meaning of
the Sixth Amendment to reasonable inference. We find it implausible that a provision
which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by
unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.1
86
By establishing formality as one prong of the test of testimonial
statements, the Davis/Hammon Court undercut the Hammon decision, and
rendered an internally contradictory decision. Moreover, this will
encourage fewer confrontations by inviting lower courts to use the
formality rationale to conclude that statements are beyond the purview of
the Confrontation Clause, thereby failing to fulfill the full promise of
Crawford.
f. Davis/Hammon Is Vague and Invites Multiple Interpretations
Davis/Hammon sets out to clarify the term testimonial from Crawford,
but in doing so created additional questions. For example, it is not clear
how a judge should determine if hearsay satisfies the formality
requirements of Davis/Hammon because, although the case held that
formality was a prong to be considered, the decision was internally
inconsistent.1 87 Nor is it clear whether a judge should consider the state of
mind of the speaker, or only the effect the speaker's state of mind has upon
the state of mind of the police in taking a statement.1
88
Judges must also divine whether the emergency exception is broad
enough to include situations where the police respond to a scene or whether
it only applies to 911 calls. When the police are at the scene, the person is
no longer "unprotected by the police." The Supreme Court distinguished
the facts in Davis from Hammon in part because the alleged victim in Davis
statement to offend the confrontation right. See also Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to
Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 2004, at 4, 9 (2004) [hereinafter Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford].
185 Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford, supra note 184, at 9 (writing that historically, the
"prosecutor plays no essential role in the violation" of the Confrontation Clause). The term
interrogation in Crawford has provided lower courts "an excuse" rather than a valid reason
to deny confrontation rights to statements made knowingly to police officers. Id.
186 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 n.3 (2004).
187 See discussion supra Section IV.B.2.v.
188 See discussion supra Section IV.B.2.c.
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was "alone, unprotected by the police."' 89  Yet the Court does not
specifically confine its holding in Davis to emergency calls. Another
ambiguity regarding the emergency exception is whether it applies to all
information that will help police learn about a potentially dangerous
situation. Describing a crime that just occurred may help to inform the
police whether an arrest is required and whether the person to be arrested
has a weapon or may be violent or dangerous. This is a broad reading of
the emergency exception. Or, perhaps once an event is over the emergency
exception only applies to the identification of a suspect. In Davis, the name
of the alleged perpetrator was not testimonial because "the operator's effort
to establish the identity of the assailant" was "so that the dispatched officers
might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon."' 90 The
majority supported this conclusion by citing to Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
District Court of Nevada, which affirmed the constitutionality of a Nevada
statute empowering police to arrest suspects who refuse to identify
themselves.' 91 In Hiibel, the Court had expressed a more relaxed
constitutional standard towards obtaining a suspect's name as compared to
other information, noting that the information "serves important
government interests" while rarely raising Fifth Amendment testimonial
concerns.192  The Hiibel Court explained the particular importance of
identification in domestic violence cases:
Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another
offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing
identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts
elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in cases such as this, where the
police are investigating what appears to be a domestic assault. Officers called to
investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to
assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential
victim. 193
Thus, although the emergency exception could be interpreted broadly,
the citation to Hiibel coupled with the reversal of Hammon, implies that the
emergency exception is limited in situations that are not ongoing to
obtaining the name of the alleged perpetrator.
Justice Thomas' criticisms of the primary purpose test also point to
weaknesses in the decision. Consider the identification testimony at the
Davis trial. The Supreme Court must divine the operator's purpose in
189 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2269, 2273-74 (2006).
190 Id. at 2276.
191 Id. (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004)).




asking for the full name of the perpetrator, starting with his last name. The
operator was following instructions on handling 911 crime reports, but the
record is silent as to the purpose behind the policy, whether it was to help
prosecute when witnesses did not appear or simply to allow police to
research criminal records of the suspect on route to the scene., 94 There is
no discussion in Davis/Hammon of the actual policy in Washington, and the
actual intentions of the individual operator are unknown. Instead, the Court
guesses that the operator's identification questions were aimed towards
helping police "know whether they would be encountering a violent
felon. ' 195  Yet police would already know they might encounter a
potentially violent felon at the scene based on the allegations made.1 96 The
Court has no way to determine that the questions on identity were designed
primarily to protect themselves in an emergency rather than to help the
police arrest, charge, and prosecute the alleged perpetrator. If the latter
reason was the primary purpose of the questions, presumably they should
194 In the reply brief for Mr. Davis, the defense identified different training materials
used by the law enforcement community that prioritized generating evidence from crime
victims for use in prosecutions. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 2-5, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No.
05-5224). Certain recommended protocols even advised 911 dispatchers dealing with
domestic violence calls to collect as much evidence as possible on the expectation that
victims would later recant their statements. Id. at 3. Recommendations included
determining details of the crime, prior threats, and details of the injury, including how the
injury occurred and when it occurred. Id. The protocols also recommended recording victim
statements that would qualify as excited utterances. Id. at 2-3 (citing Powerpoint
Presentation, Navin Sharma et al., Domestic Violence: Break the Silence, Break the Cycle at
slides 10-22, available at http://www.doh.wa.gov/hsqa/emstrauma/OTEP/domviolence.ppt).
The defense also alleged the protocols recommended that 911 operators not immediately
calm down the victim in order to preserve the excited utterance exception. Id. at 2-5.
'9' Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276. This is the full text of Davis's third prong, differentiating
the statement in Davis from that in Crawford:
Third, the nature of what was asked and answered in Davis, again viewed objectively, was such
that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather
than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in the past. That is true even of the
operator's effort to establish the identity of the assailant, so that the dispatched officers might
know whether they would be encountering a violent felon.
Id. (citing Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186).
196 Another way to understand this identification exception is that the Court is creating an
identification exception, placing identification concerns outside the purview of the
Confrontation Clause. For example, at the oral argument, the State of Washington argued:
[T]hey can be determining whether or not the defendant has a criminal history. They can
determine whether or not, from their records available to them in their police car, whether or not
the defendant has a history of assaults against police officers, whether or not he has a-a history
of carrying weapons, et cetera.
Transcript, Davis, supra note 146, at 38.
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be deemed testimonial under Davis' primary purpose test. 197 As Justice
Thomas wrote, fitting the facts to the definition of testimonial provided will
entail "an exercise in fiction."' 98
Because the Court created an exercise in fiction, other judges might
reach opposite conclusions on similar facts in both Davis- and Hammon-
type situations. A ready example can be found in the Hammon facts, where
the police came to the scene and questioned the alleged victim after
witnessing evidence that there had been destruction. It is easy to imagine
another court resolving the facts in Hammon differently than the Supreme
Court did. Although the Court decided that the primary purpose of talking
to the alleged victim at the scene of the broken glass was to resolve past
events, another court might have found there was an ongoing emergency at
the home. The alleged victim in Hammon was arguably so scared of her
abuser that she told the police nothing happened at first and became quiet
whenever the defendant tried to interfere with her conversation with the
officer. Police in this type of situation would presumably want to know
whether the defendant was a violent criminal, and whether he should be
removed from the home. Arguably the information provided by the alleged
victim was necessary for the police to determine how to help her, and
whether it would be dangerous to leave her and the defendant in the home.
One of the by-products of defining testimonial so that it is unrelated to the
role the evidence plays at trial is that any conclusions appear arbitrary.
To the extent that we should treat the new Davis/Hammon test as one
that looks at the intent of the officer, as the opinion declared, the case
produces some anomalous results. If a witness calls 911 in the hope that the
person she accuses will be arrested and charged, the statement she leaves is
presumably non-testimonial if the operator simply states, "Tell me
everything I would need to know to answer your emergency." After all, the
operator's intent is simply to gather information to respond to an
emergency. Similarly, if a witness writes a letter alleging that someone
committed a criminal act and sends it to the prosecutor's office, that would
appear to be non-testimonial under the Davis/Hammon decision because
again there was no intent by law enforcement to obtain incriminating
evidence. Surely the Court did not wish for either of these results, and
197 Another judge could view the whole call as not a call for help since the caller did not
want an ambulance. Transcript, Davis, supra note 146, at 10. The 911 operator actually
asked thirteen questions prior to asking Ms. McCottry if she needed an aid car and receiving
a response of"I'm all right" from Ms. McCottry. Joint Appendix, Petition, supra note 86, at
8-10.
198 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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perhaps that is why the majority dilutes the intent of the officer test even as
they create it. 199
The Supreme Court floundered with multiple rationales for its
conclusions on the Davis and Hammon facts, just as it had cast about in
Crawford for a definition of testimonial. The multiple factors for
determining whether a statement is testimonial invite a lack of uniformity in
applying the new test. Trial judges may weigh the factors in any way they
wish to support their conclusion that statements may or may not be
admitted without the witness. The root of the ambiguity in Davis/Hammon,
like the ambiguity in Crawford, stems from an incorrect postulation of what
the term testimonial should mean. In Section V.A, I will show how the
Court could have avoided the ambiguities and problems with fictional
standards if it had adopted a functional approach to the term testimonial,
employing a definition that looked at whether the evidence functioned as
testimony against the accused at the trial, regardless of the manner of
collecting the information prior to the trial.
g. The Shadow of Roberts
There is an echo of Roberts in Davis/Hammon's twin rulings. One
way to read the Davis/Hammon decision is that it reestablished true res
gestae statements as an exception to the Confrontation Clause because that
hearsay exception is deeply rooted. The origins of the excited utterance are
res gestae, but excited utterances have stretched res gestae beyond its
historic roots. The Court suggested that truly immediate statements would
have been permissible at the founding of the Constitution and therefore
should continue to be introduced under the new testimonial analysis. 20 0 By
199 Justice Scalia, during the oral argument of Davis asked the Senior Prosecuting
Attorney a hypothetical about an affidavit going directly to the police. It is "such an obvious
violation of your right to confront your accuser," Justice Scalia remarked. Transcript, Davis,
supra note 146, at 32-24.
200 Justice Scalia implied in Crawford that res gestae evidence would have come in at the
time of the framers. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). Crawford cites to
Thompson v. Trevanion, (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.), a civil case, but one of the first
known cases to apply res gestae. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58. In Davis, Scalia also gave the
example of a "girl's screams for aid as she was being chased by her assailant." Davis, 126 S.
Ct. at 2277. But this is not really a hearsay exception at all. As James Moorehead wrote in
1995, the term res gestae has been used to include two different categories of statements: (1)
exceptions to the hearsay rules that include excited utterances and present sense impression,
and (2) those words that constitute "the details of an act, occurrence or transaction which in
itself is relevant and provable" but by definition are not hearsay evidence because they are
"not admitted for the purpose of proving the truth of what was said, but for the purpose of
describing the relevant details of what took place." James Moorehead, Compromising the
Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res Gestae Reliability, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 203, 246 (1995).
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allowing the 911 call in Davis, the Court placed res gestae evidence with
dying declarations in exempting them from the Confrontation Clause
because of their long history. 20  The reason the Court would not do this
explicitly is that this would signal a return to Roberts, where deeply rooted
exceptions escaped the clause's requirement. This shadow of Roberts is an
indication that the Court has not found a solid framework for re-interpreting
the Confrontation Clause.
Another indication that the Court may have unconsciously descended
down the Roberts reliability path the justices so recently abandoned
occurred when the majority discussed the strength of the hearsay
evidence.20 2 The Davis/Hammon Court wrote that the alleged victim in
Davis was not acting like a witness when she spoke to the operator, for her
words were "not 'a weaker substitute for live testimony' at trial." It is
interesting that the Court would use the words "weaker substitute" implying
that the Confrontation Clause allows stronger substitutes for live witness
testimony but not weaker ones. 20 3 To the contrary, Wigmore did not think
that excited utterances were a weaker substitute for live testimony, but
rather a stronger replacement. 0 4 Roberts, in turn, did not allow weaker
In Crawford, the Court wrote:
It is questionable whether testimonial statements would ever have been admissible on that
ground in 1791; to the extent the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all, it
required that the statements be made "immediat[ely] upon the hurt received, and before [the
declarant] had time to devise or contrive any thing for her own advantage."
541 U.S. at 58 (quoting Thompson, 90 Eng. Rep. 179).
201 Crawford reads as if dying declarations were sui generic, although the decision also
recognized some historical basis for res gestae evidence: "We need not decide in this case
whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations.
If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis." Id. at 56; see also
discussion supra note 200. In Michael J. Polelle's The Death of Dying Declarations in a
Post-Crawford World, she posits that although there is scant evidence for any hearsay
exceptions at the time of the framers, the res gestae exception was actually better
documented than the dying declaration. 71 Mo. L. REV. 285, 289-96 (2006).
202 Some of the discussion during the oral argument of Davis supported the assertion that
some Justices were thinking about res gestae. Justice Souter asked Jeffrey L. Fisher, counsel
for Mr. Davis, about his state of mind theory: "[D]o you distinguish, for example, between
the-the expectation that lies behind a merely excited utterance, on the one hand, and. .. in
a true res gestae statement in the very strict sense?" Transcript, Davis, supra note 146, at 15.
Mr. Fisher answered that "it can be important to distinguish between a modem-day excited
utterance and what would have been considered res gestae type statement at common law."
Id. at 16. When the Court wrote that the 911 information in Davis was not a weaker
substitute for live witness testimony, it hinted that the Court perceived the information as
particularly reliable. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277.
203 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277 (citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)).
204 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 1748.
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substitutes, but allowed reliable, strong substitutes. 20 5 Thus, the reasoning
here sounds more like Roberts than the paradigm shifting reasoning that
Crawford pledged.
Whether evidence is weak or strong is important for harmless error
analysis but not to determine a constitutional violation. The right to
confront one's accusers should not turn on how likely a jury is to believe
the evidence without an opportunity to view the live witness. As I will set
forth in Section V.A, the scope of the clause should turn on whether the
declarant served as a witness at trial and whether the declarant's credibility
mattered to the outcome of the charges. After all, Amar posited that the
Confrontation Clause should only be concerned with stronger evidence
since weaker evidence will not be believed.0 6 Justice Stewart, writing for a
plurality in a case that pre-dated Roberts, similarly determined that the
defendant had no right to confront a jail house informant, in part because a
jury would find the statement attributed to the informant incredible.20 7
Justice Marshall articulated the point well when he pointed out that the
defense would certainly benefit from "fuller factual development which the
corrective test of cross-examination makes possible."' 0 8  Indeed, as trial
attorneys know, strong evidence will generally be made weaker by cross-
examination and weak evidence will be made even weaker. The issue
under Crawford's new era should not be whether the substitute is weak or
strong, but whether it is in fact a substitute.
V. COURTS SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER EVIDENCE Is TESTIMONIAL
BASED UPON ITS FUNCTION AT TRIAL
A. A PROPOSAL FOR A DEFINITION OF TESTIMONIAL FOCUSED ON THE
ROLE THE EVIDENCE PLAYS AT TRIAL
[Ilt is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no man shall be• 209
prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine.
205 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
206 Akhil Reid Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 694 (1996).
207 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); id. at 100 (1970) (Marshall, J, dissenting) ("Mr.
Justice Stewart's opinion for reversal characterizes as 'wholly unreal' the possibility that
cross-examination of Williams himself would change the picture presented by Shaw's
account. A trial lawyer might well doubt, as an article of the skeptical faith of that
profession, such a categorical prophecy about the likely results of careful cross-examination.
Indeed, the facts of this case clearly demonstrate the necessity for fuller factual development
which the corrective test of cross-examination makes possible.").
208 Id. at 103 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
209 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (quoting State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1
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This Article takes the position that the concept of testimonial must be
tied to the role that the evidence at issue plays at trial in order for the clause
to serve its original purpose-namely, to allow face-to-face accusations
with the opportunity to cross-examine. "Testimonial" should mean
statements that function as testimony during the trial. The primary purpose
of the clause is to make sure that witnesses make their accusations openly in
court and are subject to cross-examination, as well as to make sure that
those determining the truth of the testimony have the opportunity to assess
the witnesses' demeanor. If the veracity or reliability of the declarant is
immaterial to the charges before the court, then the evidence at issue would
clearly be non-testimonial. Whatever else this would include, the term
testimonial should apply to all statements repeated at court that are
accusatory in the context of the criminal trial, that are introduced for the
truth of their assertion, and where the reliability of the declarant could
affect the truth of the charges in that particular case. In other words, the
concepts of witness and testimony should be tied to the concept of an
accusation. By "accusation," I mean that the out-of-court witness must
have alleged that something criminal occurred or that the defendant
committed an act that is now the subject of this prosecution.
The Supreme Court should not discriminate among accusations based
upon the intent of the police in gathering the out-of-court statement, the
formality of the investigation, or the state of mind of the person making the
initial statement. Instead, the Court should consider how the out-of-court
words are being used in the particular trial. If the words constitute an
accusation of criminal wrongdoing, then even if the declarant does not
identify the defendant as the person that committed the crime, he is still the
true witness in the case. An allegation that a person committed a crime
would be non-testimonial if it were brought into a different case. For
example, if the declarant states that the defendant was driving under the
influence of alcohol, and the state wants to use this information in a murder
prosecution to disprove an alibi, then the evidence would not offend the
Confrontation Clause. Although the declarant may have intended to accuse
the defendant, the accusation was not being used to set forth the elements of
the offense, but rather to disprove the defense case.21 ° In such a case, the
jurisdiction's rules of evidence would apply rather than the Confrontation
Clause.
I disagree with the Court's assumption that the Confrontation Clause is
more concerned with preventing abuses in the creation of evidence than in
Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794)).
210 It would be admissible if it fit some hearsay exception available at the time the case
went to trial, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 803.
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preventing abuses at trial. The Confrontation Clause is a trial right, unlike
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments that concern the creation of evidence.21
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a speedy trial, a public trial
by jury, the right to be informed of the nature of the accusation, the right to
counsel, the right to compulsory process (for defendant to call witnesses),
as well as the right to confront witnesses.1 2 None of these rights primarily
involve police or the gathering of evidence. Rather, all primarily involve
the manner in which cases proceed in court. The Confrontation Clause is
particularly linked with the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel.213
As the Supreme Court stated in 1899:
[A] fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved
against an accused... except by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon whom
he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose
testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the established rules
governing the trial or conduct of criminal cases.
2 14
It is the trial that matters, not how the evidence was gathered.
211 Even Margaret Berger, a pronounced advocate of the theory that the Confrontation
Clause's core concern is police involvement in the gathering of evidence, seems to suggest
that there is more likelihood of unreliable verdicts where police have the ability to
manipulate evidence. See Berger, supra note 29. She argues that a child's statement to a
prosecutorial agent "should not be admitted regardless of whether it is reliable or the child is
produced, unless a contemporaneous recording is available... [to] ensure that the jury hears
the child's version rather than the witness's paraphrase." Id. at 612. This argument is
particularly interesting because it opposes the position taken by courts employing the
formality rationale.
212 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
213 See generally Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An
Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77 (1995) (examining in depth the history of defense
counsel and public prosecution in the United States and in England). Jonakait also argues
that the Confrontation Clause must be analyzed in relationship to the other rights contained
within the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 82. Howser v. Commonwealth explained the history of
the Confrontation Clause this way: "When the common law of England was transported to
these colonies," it failed to provide the same rights that Englishmen had. 51 Pa. 332, 337
(1865).
To remedy this state of the law, our constitutions all declared-what statutes had then provided
in England-that the accused should have an impartial trial by jury, should have process for
witnesses and be entitled to counsel to examine them, and to cross-examine those for the
prosecution in the presence of (confronting) the accused.
Id. (cited in WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 151). The development of counsel for the defense
elevated the importance of cross-examination. Jonakait, supra, at 87-94
214 Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
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B. DA VIS/HAMMON SHOULD HAVE USED A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
Had the Supreme Court applied this proposed theory to the Hammon
facts, it would have reached the same result it did but in a much cleaner
way. While the result in Hammon affirmed Crawford's promise of face-to-
face confrontation of those whose accusatory statements are presented in
place of live testimony, the Court flounders around with multiple rationales
for determining whether a statement to a police officer is testimonial. None
of the tests they propose are satisfactory, either separate or combined,
because the court is asking the wrong questions and looking at the wrong
timeframe. Hammon's holding would make more sense if the Court had
looked at the trial and asked the right questions: (1) In the context of the
charges and other evidence introduced, did the declarant's statements serve
as an accusation against the defendant at the time these statements were
repeated at trial? (2) Was the credibility of the declarant important to the
resolution of the case, or just the credibility of the person who repeated the
declarant's statement at trial?
The answer to these questions is clear: Ms. Hammon's statements
served as an accusation against Mr. Hammon at trial, so Ms. Hammon's
credibility was of utmost importance to the resolution of the charges against
her husband. Her statements established all the essential elements of the
charge against the accused. While the police provided evidence of the state
of the apartment, it was the declarant's credibility that was important to the
outcome of the trial. Without her accusation, there would be no case
against Mr. Hammon. From a functional or trial perspective, Mr.
Hammon's accuser was the "witness against him" even though she never
came to court. The Court must therefore conclude that Ms. Hammon, was a
witness in Mr. Hammon's case and that the declarant's statements served as
testimony at trial.
Had the Supreme Court applied this proposed theory to the Davis
facts, it would have reversed the Davis conviction and held that the
statements to the operator were testimonial. From a functional approach,
there is no difference between the hearsay in Davis and the hearsay in
Hammon. After all, the declarant in Davis was the key accuser at trial. To
convict the defendant, the jury must have decided that Ms. McCottry was
telling the truth to the operator when she said, "He's here jumpin' on me
again" and then named Mr. Davis as the perpetrator.1 5 If, after direct and
cross-examination of the accuser, the fact finder determined that the
declarant was not telling the truth about the allegation, then Mr. Davis
should have been acquitted. No matter what the declarant was thinking at
215 State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005), ayfd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
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the time she accused the defendant or what the operator's motivation was at
the time the statement was recorded, at trial the prosecutor used the
statement the same way a real witness would be used. Ms. McCottry's
statements served as an accusation against Mr. Davis at trial, and her
credibility was of utmost importance to the resolution of the charges. The
statement made by the missing victim served the function of testimony at
Mr. Davis' trial. For purposes of the Confrontation Clause, Ms. McCottry
was a witness against the accused.
The Supreme Court should have paid attention to the way the concept
of testimony was used at trial. During the closing argument in the Davis
trial, the government lawyer argued that the jury had heard the victim's
216testimony. Rebutting the defense lawyer's assertion that the statement
admitted in the 911 tape should not be credited because it was not under
oath or subject to cross-examination, the government counsel argued:
[Defense counsel] would like you to believe that... no one you heard from saw the
crime. That is not true. You have the voice of Ms. McCottry on the 911 tape. She
reported it right when it happened.... [J]ust consider that there was a person present
and that person is Ms. McCottry and although she is not here today to talk to you she
left you something better. She left you her testimony on the day that this happened,
February 1st, 2001, this shows that the defendant, Adrian Davis was at her home and
assaulted her. It is right here in her voice .... 217
The alleged victim "left you her testimony," the prosecutor told the jury.
Clearly, trial lawyers and jurors have an understanding of the concepts of
witness and testimony. The lawyers understood who the witness was
against Mr. Davis. Under a trial definition, the statements were testimonial.
The prosecutor had ample reason to argue that the jury heard the
witness's "testimony." After closing arguments, a trial judge instructs the
jury that it should consider the testimony together with the physical
evidence in the case to decide the facts. Therefore, trial courts permit jurors
to give the same weight to out-of-court statements as they do to live
testimony. 218  By calling the out-of-court statements "testimony," the
prosecutor was trying to show the accuser's words were every bit as
important, official, and convincing as evidence given in response to direct
216 Brief of Petitioner Davis, supra note 5, at 8.
217 Id.
218 See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 629 N.E.2d 1332, 1337 (Mass. 1994) (noting that
"the jury were entitled to credit the evidence of' declarant's statements and the defendant
was not entitled to a missing witness instruction). It is worth noting the use of the word
"testimony" in the Commonwealth v. Crawford court's opinion: "This is not a case in which
the jury heard nothing from a witness the Commonwealth would have been expected to call.
The jury heard the substance of [declarant's] testimony in the form of her extrajudicial
statements." Id. (emphasis added).
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and cross-examination.219 It was important to the prosecutor that jurors
recognize that they could weigh the statement as heavily as live testimony,
and that they could even decide to convict based on that statement alone.
Courts have much to learn from the prosecutor's use of the term in the
Davis trial.
Looking at how the Washington Supreme Court dealt with this issue
illustrates how the concept of witness and testimony becomes fictionalized
when the Supreme Court defines testimonial by how evidence is gathered
rather than the role it serves at trial. On appeal, the Washington Supreme
Court dismissed the defense's argument that the government had conceded
that the evidence was testimonial, noting that the argument had been made
before Crawford's decision was handed down.220  The court treated the
closing argument as immaterial to the question of whether the evidence was
in fact "testimonial., 221  The court explained: "[T]he statement [by the
prosecutor describing the victim's 911 call as her testimony] was made
before the Crawford decision focused Confrontation Clause analysis on the
word 'testimonial.' Since Crawford, 'testimony' has acquired a specific
meaning that should not be attributed to the State pre-Crawford.,
222
The Davis/Hammon decision unraveled the connection between the
concepts of witness and testimony established in Crawford. The Court
created a new legal fiction by using the terms "witness" and "testimony" in
a way that conflicted with what the terms mean in a trial.223 In both Davis
and Hammon, the real witness at trial was the declarant. Unless the
Supreme Court connects the terms "witness" and "testimonial" to the role
the statements play at trial, future prosecutors will quite rightly explain to
the jury that they heard the testimony from the witness while arguing to the
judge that the evidence is not testimonial under the Sixth Amendment.
219 Another way in which the prosecutor can ensure that the jury does not value the out-
of-court testimony less than the in-court testimony is by successfully blocking defense
efforts for a missing witness instruction informing the jury that they could make an inference
in favor of the defense from the absence of the witness at trial. See State v. Davis, 64 P.3d
661, 665 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), affid, 126 S. Ct. 2266
(2006).
220 State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 851 (Wash. 2005), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 In the oral argument in Hammon, Justice Stevens returned to this issue. He inquired
of Irving L. Gornstein, Assistant to the Solicitor General, "[B]ut the real question is who's
the witness under the text of the Constitution?" Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Hammon
v. Indiana, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (No. 05-5705). Justice Stevens
later added, "I think I am trying to help you." Id. at 58-59.
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C. SCHOLARS HAVE INCORRECTLY FOCUSED ON EVIDENCE
PRODUCTION RATHER THAN THE TRIAL
Scholars have proposed a number of definitions of testimonial to help
guide the Court.2 4 None has focused on the role that the evidence at issue
plays at trial. This section will examine the works of two influential
scholars who embrace a liberal reading of the Confrontation Clause and of
Crawford, but whose reasoning is marred in the same way as
Davis/Hammon by placing too much emphasis on the manner of obtaining
evidence. In proposing a new definition of testimonial, this Article builds
on some of the work of these noted scholars while moving the discussion in
a new direction.
Robert Mosteller has written that the Supreme Court should be
concerned about accusatory statements more than non-accusatory
225statements. However, his theory is quite different from the one posed in
this Article. Mosteller uses the term accusatory to mean that at the time the
person was making the statement, she intended to accuse the defendant by
causing the police to investigate or charge the defendant. 2 6 He does not
look at the role that the statement plays in the trial, as this Article
recommends.
While Mosteller's theory is broader than that of other scholars, it
closely tracks the Crawford dicta on possible core definitions of
testimonial.2 Mosteller separates statements made to government officials
224 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO.
L.J. 641 (1996); Berger, supra note 29; Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 38.
225 See Robert Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 514 n.18 (2005) [hereinafter Mosteller,
Crawford] ("Somewhat inexplicably, in my judgment, one aspect that this historical
treatment and preliminary definition leaves out is my particular focus on accusers and
accusatory statements, as opposed to testimonial statements. I believe there should be a role
for the concept of 'accusatory' hearsay in the analysis because it better describes the core
concern of the Confrontation Clause than does the testimonial concept."); Robert Mosteller,
Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenger of Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 747-49 (1993) [hereinafter Mosteller,
Remaking Confrontation Clause]; Robert Mosteller, "Testimonial" and the Formalistic
Definition-The Case for an "Accusatorial'" Fix, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2005, at 14, 16
(section titled "A better approach: Accusatorial terminology") [hereinafter Mosteller,
"Testimonial"].
226 Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause, supra note 225, at 748; Mosteller,
"Testimonial," supra note 225, at 17 ("What I suggest is that accusatory statements are
statements that are accusations, viewed at the time they were made, of conduct that is
criminal.").
227 Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist. See, e.g.,
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (noting that "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial
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from statements to private parties. Mosteller proposes that the burden of
proof to establish that a statement is testimonial be different depending on
whether it is a statement to law officers or a statement to private parties.228
He rejects the formality rationale and argues that most statements to police
are testimonial because the person knows they will be used against the
accused, and are therefore accusatory. 29 Mosteller argues that for private
statements to be testimonial, they must be accusatory in nature and uttered
with the intention that the private party would serve as a conduit to
government agents. 230 Thus, an accusatory statement made to a private
party may be testimonial, but only if "it was intended to be conveyed to
those investigating the crime.,
23 1
Friedman used the term "testimonial statements" before Crawford
established it as part of the Confrontation Clause lexicon.232  In Dial-in
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions"); Brief of
Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2006) (No. 02-9410) ("Ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.");
NACDL Brief, Crawford, supra note 140, at 3 ("Statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial."). These formulations all share a
common nucleus and then define the Confrontation Clause's coverage at various levels of
abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise articulation, some statements qualify under
any definition-for example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing." Crawford, 541
U.S. at 51-52.
228 Mosteller, Crawford, supra note 225, at 544-45. Mosteller suggests, as to private
statements, that the requirement might be that a statement must be clearly or exclusively
intended to be used as testimony whereas a statement to the police or another government
official must be treated presumptively as testimonial, unless the evidence shows that it was
clearly or exclusively intended for another purpose. Id.
229 Mosteller, "Testimonial," supra note 225, at 19; Mosteller, Crawford, supra note
225, at 544 ("Indeed, all statements made knowingly to a police officer should be considered
formally given, in that they should be expected to be admitted in evidence if of value to the
government. Thus, every statement made to a police officer, whether formally recorded or
not, could, and I contend should, be considered formal"); id. at 554 ("In fact, the possibility
of governmental manipulation is even greater with informal statements because witnesses
are not constrained by contemporaneous written records that may check additions and
modifications.").
230 Mosteller, Crawford, supra note 225, at 571-74.
231 Id. at 544.
232 Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 38, at 1026. Professor Richard Friedman has
been particularly influential in delineating the failure of pre-Crawford jurisprudence to
provide meaningful Sixth Amendment protections. Friedman requested certiorari in
Hammon, Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005)
(No. 05-5705), authored the appellant's brief, see Brief of Petitioner Hammon, supra note
176, at i, and was cited by the majority opinion in Crawford. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61
(citing Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 38); see also Douglass, supra note 61, at 1803
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Testimony, Friedman and McCormack seek to expand upon the theories
offered by Justice Thomas, Akhil Amar, and Margaret Burger, who all
focus on the government's role in determining what statements are
implicated by the Confrontation Clause. 3 Friedman and McCormick offer
a state of mind approach in determining application of the Confrontation
Clause: "If a statement is made in circumstances in which a reasonable
person would realize that it likely would be used in investigation or
prosecution of a crime, then the statement should be deemed
testimonial., 234  This is very similar to Mosteller's recommendation,
although Mosteller uses the term accusatory statements to narrow the reach
of the clause rather than the term testimonial. However, Friedman and
McCormack's theory suffers from the same problem as Mosteller's. In
lamenting the lack of confrontation in the domestic violence cases they
reviewed, Friedman and McCormack focused on the time the evidence was
gathered, when their critique should have been framed around the manner in
which trials were conducted.235
Both Friedman and Mosteller endorse an approach to 911 calls that
would determine admissibility based on the declarant's point of view when
making the statement.236  One might reach the same result in
Davis/Hammon using either Friedman's or Mosteller's views, but my test is
more likely to secure the result that both scholars favor. Both Friedman and
Mosteller seek to encourage in-court sworn statements subject to cross-
examination. Mosteller wrote: "I suggest that the path of the law's
development will be improved if the clause read as a positive command to
afford the accused the right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against
him' rather than principally as a negative restriction on the admission of
certain out-of-court evidence., 237 Friedman and McCormack wrote: "We
n. 19 (writing that Richard Friedman and Margaret Berger filed an amicus brief in Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999)).
233 Friedman & McCormack, supra note 3, at 1246. Note that Friedman is also building
on his own earlier theories. See Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 38; Richard D.
Friedman, Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
545 (1998).
234 Friedman & McCormack, supra note 3, at 1240-41.
235 Id. ("[I]f a person makes a statement in circumstances under which-but for the
confrontation right-she would understand that the statement would likely be used as
evidence against the accused, the person is acting as a witness against the accused, making a
testimonial statement .... A standard somewhat easier to apply, but yielding similar results,
would be: If a statement is made in circumstances in which a reasonable person would
realize that it likely would be used in investigation or prosecution of a crime, then the
statement should be deemed testimonial.").
236 Mosteller, Crawford, supra note 225, at 613.
237 Mosteller, Crawford, supra 225, at 514.
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believe the best way of approaching the Confrontation Clause is to construe
it to ensure the result at which it was aimed, that prosecution testimony be
given in formal proceedings, subject to the oath and confrontation by the
accused.,1 38 Hence, their theory arguably fits with the result in Hammon
where the government was barred from introducing out-of-court statements
instead of the accuser herself.
Although Mosteller and Friedman seek more confrontation, the result
in Davis, allowing the 911 call to substitute for live evidence, is also
arguably consistent with their views. In Dial-in Testimony, Friedman and
McCormack exempt a cry for help from the scope of the Confrontation
Clause. As the 911 call in Davis could easily be considered a cry for help,
the result in Davis is consistent with Friedman's views even though the
Court's rationale focusing on the intent of the officer is inconsistent with
Friedman's theory.239  Mosteller would also seem to tolerate the
introduction of some emergency 911 calls into evidence, but only if a judge
found that the 911 statements were made for purposes other than to report a
crime and that the callers did not know they were calling law enforcement
personnel.2 40  This arguably fits with the result in Davis as well.
Foreshadowing Davis/Hammon, Mosteller wrote: "At some point in a
conversation, which initially began for a purpose other than establishing
guilt in a criminal case, the purpose may change to the testimonial purpose
of creating evidence.",24' Thus, although both scholars profess a positive
command to produce live witnesses in the Confrontation Clause, their
theories would admit hearsay evidence even when it serves as the functional
equivalent of an in-court accusation and when guilt or innocence turns on
the credibility of the absent accuser.
238 Friedman & McCormack, supra note 3, at 1252; see also id. at 1228 ("The
willingness of courts to allow prosecutors to prove their cases through dial-in testimony,
without even demonstrating why the caller has not been brought to court as a witness,
demonstrates that something has gone very wrong with the jurisprudence of the
confrontation right; a proper conception of the right would not tolerate the practice.").
239 Id. at 1242. Friedman and McCormack explain this cry for help quite narrowly: cries
for help are non-testimonial "at least to the extent they are not offered to prove the truth of
what they assert." This sounds more like what this Article recommends: looking at the way
the evidence is used at trial. The authors then continue by writing that "the more the
statement narrates events, rather than merely asking for help, the more likely it is to be
considered testimonial." Id.; see also Richard J. Friedman, Grappling With The Meaning of
"Testimonial," 71 BROOK. L. REv. 241, 255-56 (2005). But see Friedman, supra note 38, at
1039 ("If, by contrast, the declarant correctly understands that her statement will be
presented at trial, than [sic] the statement does appear testimonial.").




One problem with focusing on how evidence is gathered instead of the
role it plays at trial is that it permits manipulation by police and police
agents. As Mosteller notes, the government is all too happy to change its
methods of gathering information to conform to admissibility
requirements42 Field investigations will be manipulated in order to make
it fit the definition of testimonial.243
Manipulation may be bad for confrontation rights but we should not
blame the police for working to ensure that cases are not dismissed for a
lack of witnesses.244 After all, in the Miranda context, police have learned
to give the warnings to suspects in such a way that they still manage to
obtain statements, and alteration of confession-gathering is not perceived
negatively. 245 On the contrary, altered police practices incorporating the
Supreme Court rulings such as Miranda or those governing search and
seizure are viewed as the proper adjustment mandated by resolution of the
Confrontation Clause; it was a correction rather than manipulation.246 The
Fifth Amendment concern was with the manner in which evidence was
gathered, not a hope that there would be fewer confessions at trial. Thus, it
was hoped and expected that police would change their practices to adapt to
242 Mosteller, Crawford, supra note 225, at 568 ("[T]wo factors can easily be
manipulated. Statements, once taken at the station house, could henceforth be made in the
field, and they might not be formally recorded. Even as to the structured questioning, a
bright line could sometimes be avoided. The first interview with a victim might be
conducted by an officer using only a single or a few 'what happened?'-type questions.").
243 Id. at 529-30, 539-40, 543-44, 566. This argument forms a large part of the Hammon
brief before the Supreme Court. See Brief of Petitioner Hammon, supra note 176.
244 See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 47 & n.192 (2006)
(noting that "prosecutors are trained to draft DV complaints using hearsay exceptions, such
as the victim's excited utterances at the scene" and that "[t]his drafting practice will
undoubtedly have to be modified after Davis v. Washington").
245 See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 743 (1992)
("For the police, the Miranda procedure was relatively easy to incorporate into their standard
arrest practices."). A report by the American Bar Association found that "[a] very strong
majority of those surveyed-prosecutors, judges, and police officers-agree that compliance
with Miranda does not present serious problems for law enforcement." AM. BAR ASS'N,
SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIM. JUSTICE IN A FREE SOC'Y, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRIsIs 28 (1988);
see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw.
U. L. REV. 500, 505 (1996). William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975,
985 (2001) ("[T]hese lax waiver decisions are a natural corollary to using Miranda to
encourage good police questioning (and to discourage the bad kind). If that is Miranda's
object, courts should give police a good deal of leeway to persuade suspects to talk-as long
as those same courts strictly enforce the ban on post-invocation questioning."). But see Paul
G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998).
246 See Stuntz, supra note 245, at 976-77.
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the new rules. The Sixth Amendment is different. Police adaptation to new
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence will create bad outcomes in the
confrontation context because the clause aspires to result in fewer absent
witnesses and more in-court testimony. The fault does not lie with the
police. Rather, the problem is the Court's focus on the gathering of
statements to satisfy confrontation rights that confuses the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause, a trial right, with production rights that
reside in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
By accepting that the clause is most concerned with the production of
evidence rather than the recitation of evidence at trial, Mosteller fails to
cure the problem he envisions because his definition of testimonial does not
eliminate manipulation. 247  For example, if the testimonial nature of 911
calls is determined by whether the speaker is making a call for help or
whether the official staffing the help line is seeking information to aid in
prosecution, 911 operators can be trained to ensure maximum admissibility
of calls made to them. 248 These operators can ask questions that obtain
information essential to trial early in the conversation. Then, the operators
can question the declarant about whether she feels safe or threatened at the
time she phones in the accusation, so a judge might deem it part of the
emergency response. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent a judge from
interpreting 911 calls and statements to police at the scene as calls for help,
even if Mosteller and other scholars would think that the evidence fits
squarely in the accusatorial domain.
Similarly, Friedman and McCormack describe the reasonable state of
mind standard broadly, and assume it will result in more live confrontation
in criminal trials. 249 Friedman and McCormick note that most people who
call the police know that the government is going to use the information to
247 Mosteller, supra note 225, at 529-30 ("by others that are similar in substantive result,
but less clearly produce testimonial statements").
248 As set forth Section IV.B.2.d, supra, there will be efforts underway to change
practices after Davis, just as there were after Crawford.
249 See People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that
Crawford states "an objective, 'reasonable person' test," but the court still held the
statements are non-testimonial since "no reasonable person in John's shoes would have
expected his statements to Dr. Russell to be used prosecutorially, at defendant's
trial... even if he thought the doctor might relay his statements to the police."). The
reasonable person standard can (and arguably should) easily be converted into a reasonable
victim standard, as we have seen in post-Crawford cases. But see United States v. Cromer,
389 F.3d 662, 673 (6th Cir. 2004) (accepting Friedman's view that "[a] statement made
knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal activity is almost always testimonial,"
and applying it in a drug trafficking case, where the police testified that a confidential




aid investigation and possible prosecution of the person they are
accusing. 25°  However, some calls are a cry for help.251  Friedman and
McCormack explain this cry for help quite narrowly: cries for help are non-
testimonial "at least to the extent they are not offered to prove the truth of
what they assert., 252 The authors then continue by writing that "the more
the statement narrates events, rather than merely asking for help, the more
likely it is to be considered testimonial. 253
While scholars view the state of mind theory of confrontation as an
expansive reading of the clause requiring more confrontation of witnesses,
there is no assurance that the theory will actually result in more
confrontation in practice. There is little incentive for judges to apply the
same standards of reasonableness as Friedman and McCormack, and there
is strong incentive for judges to rule in ways that allow a trial to proceed in
the absence of witnesses.254 After all, the defendant's case is likely to be
dismissed if judges construe the statements as testimonial. If the statements
are deemed non-testimonial, the only recourse for the defendant is an appeal
after a conviction, for which the standard of review will be the deferential
255abuse of discretion.
250 Friedman and McCormack, supra note 3, at 1250-5 1.
251 Id. at 1240-44. Friedman and McCormack espouse an objective test, but sometimes
the article lapses into subjective language, such as in the following instance: "If a person
made a statement with the anticipation that it would be used in prosecuting the accused, and
the statement were so used, then the person should be deemed to be testifying against the
accused." Id. at 1240.
252 Id. at 1242.
253 Id. Although the authors propose a state of mind test generally, here the distinction
they make between cries for help that are testimonial versus cries for help that are non-
testimonial do not consider the mindset of the person making the call nor of a reasonable
person making the call. Rather, the distinction they draw depends on the way the evidence is
used at trial, even though they do not consciously endorse such a test. Where the statements
are "not offered to prove the truth of what they assert," there is no confrontation problem,
but where the narrative is used to prove what actually happened, then the evidence is
testimonial. Id. That is a distinction this Article would draw, for it is based on how the
evidence is used at trial-a functional theory that is less capable of manipulation and more
connected to the purposes of the clause.
254 See infra note 258.
255 See, e.g., Barbeck v. Twinsburg Twp., 597 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
("Given its superior vantage, the trial court enjoys broad discretion in the admission and
exclusion of evidence and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse which had materially
prejudiced an objecting party."). Rarely will a trial judge be overruled. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Mass. 2002) (finding that a trial judge
had the discretion to admit a statement made by the defendant's girlfriend upon his arrest);
id. at 149 (Cowin, J. dissenting) (noting that the statement allowed by the majority was "not
an emotionally generated outcry but an attempt to explain the incident").
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Friedman has written about the Framers' distrust of judges in their
gatekeeper function in determining whether a jury is entitled to see the
accuser.256 But his theory does not put sufficient safeguards in place to
satisfy the Framers' distrust of judges as gatekeepers. Although he decried
the lack of confrontation rights in domestic violence trials, the state of mind
test that Friedman proposed was frequently misused after Crawford to
deprive defendants of confrontation rights.257 Many courts after Crawford
have used the state of mind test as a way of depriving confrontation rights
in domestic violence cases. Some courts have held that all excited
utterances are, by definition, made without time to reflect and therefore are
not made in contemplation of prosecution. 8  Other courts, such as the
Indiana courts deciding Hammon, have looked at the state of mind of the
victim in a case-by-case approach and still conclude that the declarant was
not making the statement in contemplation of its use in the upcoming
trial.259 Post-Crawford opinions make it clear that regardless of whether
courts employ an objective or subjective standard, as long as they apply a
state of mind test, many courts will find that declarants would not have
thought about the results of calling the police, so their statements to
operators are not testimonial.
Only by forcing judges to look at the trial itself and the way evidence
is used will manipulation become impossible. Mosteller's aspiration that
the clause be read as a positive command to afford more confrontation will
only be achieved if trial judges consider whether the evidence before them
256 Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 38, at 1029 ("If such a reliability test were
applied rigorously-admitting a statement only if the courts were extremely confident that it
was so clearly reliable that cross-examination would have done no good-very little
evidence would satisfy it. But some courts, at least, are more inclined to treat the test as a
generous doorway for prosecution evidence.").
257 See, e.g., People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (quoted
approvingly in State v. Davis 111 P.3d 811, 849-50 (Wash. 2005), aff'd, 126 S. Ct. 2266
(2006)). See generally Friedman & McCormack, supra note 3.
258 See, e.g., State v. Ohlson, 125 P.3d 990, 995 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (deciding "to
adopt a per se rule that excited utterances are not testimonial" because it "is not reasonable to
regard an excited utterance as 'bearing witness' such that the declarant would know that it
would be used in a later prosecution").
259 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v.
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) ("[W]e believe that whether a statement from a
declarant to a police officer is testimonial will hinge upon the intent of the declarant in
making the statement and the purpose for which the police officer elicited the statement.");
see Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 829 N.E.2d 444
(Ind. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) ("An unrehearsed
statement made without time for reflection or deliberation, as required to be an 'excited
utterance,' is not 'testimonial' in that such a statement, by definition, has not been made in
contemplation of its use in a future trial.").
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at trial functions as testimony and therefore requires the opportunity for
cross-examination. This in-court analysis cannot be as readily manipulated
by prosecutors and police or misapplied by judges.
While the test I propose is consistent with the views of Mosteller and
Friedman, my test is more likely to secure the result that both scholars
favor.
D. WHY SOME CASUAL STATEMENTS MAY BE TESTIMONIAL AND
SOME STATEMENTS OBTAINED DURING STRUCTURED POLICE
QUESTIONING ARE NOT
The definition of "testimonial" I propose is broader in some respects
and narrower in others from that proposed by other commentators. It is
broader than what any other commentator has adopted because it applies the
clause to some statements made to non-police even though the declarant did
not realize how the government would take and use his statement. Under
my definition of testimonial, even a casual statement of one person to
another should be subject to cross-examination if the prosecution intends to
convict the defendant on the basis of that informal accusation and the judge
recognizes that the credibility of the declarant is material to the outcome of
the case. This proposed definition is arguably at odds with the Crawford
decision, but only at odds with dicta in Crawford and is, in fact, congruous
with Crawford's holding.26°
A hypothetical can illustrate why the clause is broad enough to include
casual accusations made out-of-court and repeated at trial. Imagine if the
government, upon hearing an allegation of domestic violence, searched e-
mail databases and diaries and interviewed neighbors to learn about remarks
and accusations concerning assaultive behaviors that were made without the
purpose of alerting authorities. To convict on these statements without live
witnesses would offend the notion that "no man shall be prejudiced by
evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine. 261 Similarly,
imagine if the historic Salem witch trials had proceeded without the
presence of the declarants, and their slanderous accusations had been
simply repeated by other townspeople in court. The mere fact that someone
has no intention that his remarks will end up in court is hardly proof that
cross-examination is unnecessary to probe bias or mistake. Indeed, the very
concept of face-to-face confrontation rests in part on the presumption that
people are more likely to tell the truth if they realize that there are
260 See supra Section II.
261 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (I
Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794)).
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consequences to their words, including the consequence of putting another
in jeopardy of losing her liberty.
Casual statements played a role in the early abuses in England.262 In
the hated Court of High Commission in England, proceedings could be
initiated by hearsay evidence that "the accused's guilt was 'blowen abroad'
or 'bruited about' the community," or that mere rumors of heresy existed. 63
Foxe's Book of Martyrs, published abroad by the Marian exiles, recounted
how during the reign of Queen Mary, "people were held on suspicion
supported only by reports of informers or the tittle-tattle of neighbors and
acquaintances. 264
Much is made of Sir Walter Raleigh's trial in Crawford and many
have opined that his famous conviction had an impact on the Confrontation
Clause.265 When Raleigh demanded that Lord Cobham be produced, the
gravamen of Raleigh's objection was that the government had accused him
based upon out-of-court allegations primarily by his alleged accomplice,
266Cobham, repeated in court. The case's legacy has sometimes been
understood as a critique of the way the government convinced Cobham to
finger Raleigh. For example, some think that police falsely informed
Cobham that Raleigh had snitched on him, but modem courts allow a
certain amount of deception in gathering statements from suspects-hence
the trickery of gathering evidence can hardly be as pronounced as the focus
262 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 30 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6342 (1997 & Supp. 2006).
263 Id. at 252 n.483.
264 Id. at 247-48. Foxe's Book of Martyrs, published in 1554 and 1559, was devoted to
accounts of the trials of the persecuted in England. "[C]opies were carried to America by the
early settlers." Id. at 248 n.453.
265 Id. at 258-59 nn.533-41 (discussing the range of claims concerning Raleigh's effect
on the framing of the Confrontation Clause). Wright and Graham conclude that "Raleigh's
tale is part of the story of the Confrontation Clause, but far from the whole story." Id. at
259. Sir Walter Raleigh was charged with conspiring with Lord Cobham and two others
with treason against King James I. Id. at 260. Wright and Graham describe Raleigh as a
combination of "[e]xplorer, poet, historian, proto-scientist, political adventurer" and
"extravagant character." Id. at 258. After Raleigh was convicted in "less than 15 minutes"
by a jury in 1603 and sentenced to death, he received a reprieve, spent thirteen years in the
Tower, and was "paroled to go on a gold-seeking expedition," only to have his original
sentence carried out:
Thus, in what may well be the most ironic moment in the history of the right of a confrontation, a
man who had gained fame fighting the Spanish, then was convicted of conspiring with them
against his own government, was finally put to death to satisfy their demands. It is a fitting close
to this chapter of the story.
Id. at 268-69; see also Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay
Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BuLL. 99, 100 & n.4 (1972).
266 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
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of Raleigh's impassioned plea to "let my accuser come face to face and be
deposed., 267  Although the Raleigh court received government-created
evidence such as interrogatories, part of the evidence from the absent
Cobham was in the form of letters that may have been unsolicited by the
government. 268 The problem was not that Cobham must have known that
the government would introduce his unsigned letter when he wrote it, but
that the government introduced it instead of producing the declarant. In
other words, it was not that the government lied about what Cobham said,
but that Cobham may have lied in saying it; so his appearance at trial would
be especially critical. It was the letter's use at trial, not its manufacture, that
offended those interested in ensuring a right to confront witnesses in the
United States.
Raleigh also complained about the other types of hearsay introduced at
trial:
[I]f witnesses are to speak by relation of one another, by this means you may have any
man's life in a week; and I may be massacred by mere hearsay .... You say that
Brooke told Watson what Cobham told Brooke, that I said to him;-what proof is
this? To show that mv Lord Cobham accuseth me tru 6 , you vouch Watson and
Brooke, men with whom I never had to do in my life ....
Treatise authors Wright and Graham explained that hearsay rules were less
developed then: "For the judges of the time, it was enough to instruct the
jury that all the hearsay was only for 'corroboration.'
' 270
Professor Amar has written that casual statements need not be subject
to cross-examination, as the jury is likely not to give them high value
because they were made casually. 271 This assumption is disproved by the
fact that casual admissions to jailhouse informants have helped to place
men on death row. 2 7 2  Moreover, the Framers' distrust of government
267 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 262, at 265 & n.586 (citing DAVID JARDINE, 1
CRIMINAL TRIALS 427 (1832)).
268 Mosteller, Crawford, supra note 225, at 545 ("While the voluntariness of the
statements may be doubted, nothing in the proceedings indicated that the first letter was
solicited by the Council and the second was stated to be unsolicited.").
269 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 262, at 265-66 (citing JARDINE, supra note 267, at
429-30).
270 JARDINE, supra note 267, at 430; Mosteller, Crawford, supra note 225, at 569 (writing
"[t]he hearsay rule of that time did not have the ready exceptions available today").
271 Amar, supra note 206, at 694 ("By contrast, a jury would be much more likely to
discount friend B's tale, since B took no oath, and may have been speaking loosely ... ").
272 See NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE
SNITCH SYSTEM: How SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT
AMERICANS TO DEATH Row (2005), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/
SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf (describing in detail how the use of jailhouse informants
contributed to the conviction of specific innocent defendants); Michael L. Radelet & Hugo
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should be interpreted more broadly than a distrust in the manner of
producing statements later brought into trial. The government's role is
large in criminal cases: it brings the charges, interviews witnesses, arranges
for these witnesses to appear at trial, and argues the case to the jury. The
essence of the government's role in a criminal trial is to attempt to take
away the liberty of another human being. Even where the government
seeks some sanction less than incarceration, the conviction is almost certain
to amount to a deprivation of rights. Since the most significant deprivation
of rights comes after trial and not during the gathering of the evidence, it is
the use of a statement at trial, rather than how the statement was garnered,
that makes it a tool of the government. Perhaps the fact that casual
statements are not generally admissible in criminal trials and their veracity
is often doubted makes it seem like such a safe bet to banish them from the
reach of the Confrontation Clause. However, if we could imagine a world
in which people were generally hauled off to jail based on casual statements
later forwarded to the police, the limitations on the clause endorsed by
scholars Amar, Friedman, and Mosteller would make little sense. 273
The Framers did not create the Confrontation Clause in order to
change the manner in which the government gathers evidence or
investigates a case.274  Take grand jury testimony, for example. As
Crawford states, one of the core abuses that the Confrontation Clause
guards against is the possibility of grand jury testimony introduced in place
275of live testimony. Yet the Framers were not opposed to grand jury
proceedings nor would the Framers have wished the grand jury process to
be replaced with a more casual gathering of statements. In fact, being
Adam Bedau, The Execution of the Innocent, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Aug. 1998, at 105;
The Innocence Project: Jailhouse Snitches, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/
snitches.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) ("The use of jailhouse informants, especially in
return for deals, special treatment, or the dropping of charges, has proven to be a specious
form of evidence, as has testimony that has only appeared after rewards were offered. Often,
the testimony of these snitches and informants has been the key in sending an innocent man
or woman to prison for a crime he or she did not commit.... In Canada, after the
exoneration of Guy Paul Morin, a commission was established to review the causes of his
conviction and propose remedies for similar situations. The Commission's findings can be
downloaded at http://www.attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/.").
273 Although Friedman does not specifically address how the Framers would view a
system where the government gathered informal statements that were originally made
without any intention that they would later be used at trial, his focus on declarants knowing
that they are testifying implicitly allows other informal statements to be introduced at trial,
such as accusations that substitute for face-to-face testimony. This seems inconsistent with
Friedman's own disparagement of the formality requirement, and his general arguments in
favor of a system where informal accusations should not take the place of sworn testimony.
274 Mosteller, Crawford, supra note 225, at 565.
275 Crawford v. United States, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
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indicted by a grand jury is a right that benefits the accused and the Framers
mandated such a proceeding elsewhere in the Bill of Rights.276 The
Framers simply did not want that right to replace the confrontation right at
trial.277 Hence, it is not a distrust of the creation of the evidence that lies at
the heart of the clause, but rather a concern that canned evidence not
substitute for live testimony.
In sum, there is widespread agreement that the Sixth Amendment is
connected to the Framers' distrust of government, but this distrust should
not end when the government gathers seemingly casual comments, whose
truth or falsity determines the validity of the charges, and turns them into
the cornerstone of a trial. After all, the government's role in a criminal
prosecution is hardly limited to producing information; the confrontation
right is a trial right, and the government's biggest role at trial is in
presenting its case against the accused. It is obviously easier and more
efficient to do so without requiring the presence or cross-examination of
witnesses, but as Crawford decrees, that is precisely what the clause
requires.
The definition I propose is also narrower than many interpretations of
Crawford because certain hearsay would need not be subject to cross-
examination, even if such statements were gathered by law enforcement for
law enforcement purposes. Even where a witness knows he is speaking to
the police and gives a narrative, that evidence may not offend the
Confrontation Clause if the evidence is used for some other purpose than to
prove the events described therein.
For example, imagine that a fictional Ms. Crawford simply gave the
interrogating officer the address where she and Mr. Crawford resided. This
background information may be useful to the government in a number of
ways, perhaps to show that a person seen near that residence was likely to
be Mr. Crawford. Other theorists might claim this statement to be
testimonial since it was obtained during police interrogation. Yet the
functional approach would say that this information was not testimonial
evidence; Ms. Crawford would not be Mr. Crawford's accuser in the way
that Cobham was Raleigh's or the way she was in the actual Crawford case.
In our hypothetical, it would be difficult for a prosecutor to argue that the
jury knew Mr. Crawford was guilty because they have the words from "the
witness."
For a more complicated example, imagine that a fictional Ms.
Crawford gave some valuable information to the police, such as informing
276 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
277 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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them that she was raped and that her husband knew that she was raped
because she told him. The government would like to use this information in
her husband's trial because it helps them prove a motive for the subsequent
killing of the rapist. Unlike the true Crawford situation, Ms. Crawford does
not then say that the victim was killed or that her husband did the killing.
Other theorists would allow this statement to be admitted in court if the
police learned of it during a cry for help to a 911 operator or to a neighbor,
but not if the police interviewed her more formally. The functional
approach that I propose would decide whether or not Ms. Crawford
constitutes an accuser under the Sixth Amendment based on the facts of this
case. Proving a motive for a killing is very different from proving an
element or all the elements of the charge. This information was helpful to
the government, but it did not make Ms. Crawford an accuser at the trial.
Thus, not every piece of information at trial would count as an accusation.
Another example would be a hospital record in which a victim said her
arm hurts. This statement would be non-testimonial, whereas the statement
"Betty hit me" would be testimonial in a trial against Betty for assault.
While having a hurt arm is relevant to whether or not the victim was
assaulted by Betty, it is not an accusation. For either situation, the trial
judge need not worry about whether the physician who examined the
patient did so primarily for the purpose of testifying for the state or whether
the statement was similar to a cry for help. For the complaint about a sore
arm, the admissibility of her medical condition may be decided by evidence
law and does not offend the Constitution.78 For the victim's accusation
against Betty of criminal wrongdoing, this would only be admitted during a
criminal trial if the alleged victim was there, in person, to cross-examine.
My proposed test is consistent with the test for admitting business
records in criminal cases. Courts would look to the use of the evidence at
trial rather than the purpose the officer had in asking the questions
contained in the reports. Under my proposed functional theory, police
reports would be admissible for non-accusatory purposes, such as proving
that a police officer had been out in the field for four hours that day, or had
278 This definition of testimonial is consistent with the old rule regarding statements for
the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. The majority rule before 1975 "prevented
admission of testimony concerning the cause of the injury as not connected with treatment
and excluded statements made to a physician who examined the patient solely for the
purpose of testifying." United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980).
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) expanded upon prior practice based on the reliability of
statements to doctors given a "patient's strong motive to tell the truth because diagnosis or
treatment will depend in part upon what the patient says." Id. at 83-84. This federal rule




just arrested a different person twenty minutes before the call came in the
current case. However, the government could not introduce a report from
Officer Smith that states "suspect admitted he assaulted victim" in the
absence of Officer Smith. Officer Smith would be the accusing witness at
trial, and his presence would be required. One might say that the rules of
evidence already apply this functional approach to business records in
criminal trials.
279
Judges already look at how evidence functions in the context of a trial
to determine relevancy, so it is well within their capabilities to determine
the function the evidence plays at trial. Unlike the Davis/Hammon Court's
jurisprudence that looks backwards, a jurisprudence based on the role that
the evidence plays at trial will involve less speculation. It will also be
capable of review by an appellate court because the record of the
proceedings will preserve the role the evidence plays in the trial and it does
not require a trial judge to weigh the credibility of the police officer in
making this determination. This should result in less deference to a trial
judge's findings than in the review of the reliability of evidence
determinations under Roberts.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE TRIUMPH OF FORM OVER SUBSTANCE
Under the new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence announced in
Crawford, asking whether a statement is testimonial is the same thing as
asking whether an absent witness constitutes a witness for the purposes of
the Confrontation Clause. This Article applauds the Court's connection
between the concepts of "witness" and "testimony" and recommends that
the connection be strengthened by looking at what these two terms mean in
the context of a criminal trial.
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari for the cases of Davis v.
Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, the Court had an opportunity to
clarify Crawford and to reaffirm Crawford's goal of live witnesses at trial.
Instead, the Court's decision in Davis/Hammon created new uncertainties
and continued Crawford's contradiction between its stated goal for more
confrontation and its analysis that shrinks the scope of the Confrontation
279 Although the Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) creates a hearsay exception for certain
public records and reports, it specifically excludes reports of law enforcement personnel
offered against the accused in a criminal case: "The legislative history of the rule makes it
plain that Congress fully intended to exclude such reports against the accused." See GEORGE
FISHER, EVIDENCE 503 (2002). Similarly, when the Supreme Court states that business
records are likely exempt from the Confrontation Clause, see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, the
Court does not mean that states may allow police reports into evidence against the person




Clause. Moreover, Crawford's central contradiction was no longer just
dicta. The Court in Davis/Hammon determined that whether accusatory
statements fell within the Confrontation Clause depended on how the
inculpating statements were gathered by the government, rather than
whether the statements served the place of live testimony at trial, thereby
cementing Crawford's contradiction.
The real witness in a trial is not the person who repeats the statement,
such as the police officer in Hammon or the operator or tape recorder in
Davis, but the person who made the statement accusing the defendant of a
crime. It is the declarant's credibility that matters when the fact finders
deliberate about the truth of the charges. Those accusations are
"testimonial," for they constitute out-of-court statements that substitute for
live testimony at trial. The original purpose of the Confrontation Clause
was not to tell the government how to investigate cases but to allow
criminal defendants to test the reliability of all testamentary evidence
through direct and cross-examination. The Court can recognize this
fundamental purpose of the clause without returning to Roberts and without
turning its back on Crawford's promise or its holding. In fact, this
recognition is essential to fulfill Crawford's promise.
The Davis/Hammon decision suffers in its reasoning and clarity
because it did not take a functional approach to the evidence before it. The
Court flounders around, grabbing different tests as it attempts to
differentiate the "testimonial" statements introduced in the Hammon trial
from the "non-testimonial" statements introduced in the Davis trial. In
trying to find a principled way to distinguish the statements in Davis from
Crawford, the Court used the state of mind of the witness at the time she
made the statement, the immediacy of the crime, and the formality of
questioning by the police in addition to analyzing the objective intent of the
officer. The Court appears dissatisfied with any particular test to determine
testimonial, and fails to provide a clear definition of core testimonial
statements in Davis/Hammon.
While the multitude of tests hides some of the incongruities of any one
test, it fails to provide true guidance for lower courts applying this new
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Worse, the confused analysis allows
future courts too much leeway in differentiating the statements before them
from statements deemed testimonial in Crawford and Hammon, thereby
encouraging judges to allow in substitutes for live testimony in future trials.
Whenever statements fall outside the scope of the newly constituted
Confrontation Clause, judges are free to make the same old reliability
determinations and decide that having a live witness adds nothing to a
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jury's ability to render an assessment of the truth of the charge. 280 Hence,
the Court needs to be very particular about what type of evidence it
excludes from the scope of the clause. With the Davis/Hammon case, the
Court has arguably created a system in which judges decide the reliability
of all accusations except those made in response to government officials
whose primary purpose was to establish past events. The prosecutor in
Davis used the term testimony in the correct sense when she informed the
jury that the alleged victim "left you her testimony." 
281
As long as the Court casts its sights backwards, trying to divine the
primary purpose that a reasonable officer would have in asking questions or
divining the thought process of a reasonable absent witness in making
statements, the Court will create a disconnect between the term "witness" as
it appears in the Sixth Amendment and the term "witness" as it is
commonly understood at trial, meaning a person whose credibility is at
issue to the outcome of the charge. After Crawford and Davis/Hammon,
witness no longer means witness and testimonial has become unmoored
from the concept of testimony at trial.
280 James Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner's Report On Ohio v. Roberts, CRIM. JUST.,
Fall 2006, at 37, 37-38 (explaining how oblique the reference was when Davis overruled
Roberts. From hereon in, whether hearsay evidence is unreliable is no longer a concern of
the Confrontation Clause.).
281 See discussion supra at Section III.B. The closing argument appeared in the Davis
appellate brief. Brief of Petitioner Davis, supra note 5, at 8.
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